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Introduction
As the United States has grown from a regional power to a global hegemon, it has
undergone consistent foreign policy evolution. Nowhere is this more prevalent than Latin
America. The U.S. sought first to rid the New World of European influence with the
Monroe Doctrine. As U.S. might grew in North America, the nation sought to expand
economically. The earliest expansion occurred in Central America, where the U.S.
worked to secure a transisthmian route and battled against the British Presence.
Following the Central American conflict, the U.S. clashed with the most powerful
South American country, Chile. The U.S. would manipulate a minor encounter into a
diplomatic crisis in order to assert its dominance over Chile with the threat of war. These
aggressive tactics would reign supreme in U.S. diplomatic relations, as the isolationism
ideals espoused by earlier American leaders done away with.
The U.S. would then look to its southern border, the Caribbean for its next bout of
expansion. Aggressive economic and political penetration would render Cuba directly
intertwined in the U.S. economy. The U.S. would eventually go to war with Spain, once a
major world power, to finalize the European exit from the Caribbean, and create an
“American Mediterranean” in the Gulf of Mexico.
The 20th century would see the dialing back of direct American intervention. The
U.S. would institute new policies of non-intervention, realizing that constant intercession
was turning the American countries against them. Though the U.S. would never erase the
harm that it had caused to Latin America, it worked to create a sense of unity western
hemisphere in the face of growing European powers.

1

The most recent change comes in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center in September 2001. Prior to this, the U.S. had focused its efforts in Latin
America on counter-narcotics programs. The U.S. forms of aid would radically shift
towards a counter terrorist objective. As the largest change in U.S. foreign policy in
recent decades, it begs the question whether the shift is purely reactionary or whether it is
calculated. Through careful research of the history and motivations behind U.S.-Latin
American Policy, inferences can be made about the future success of current anti-terrorist
policy, and whether the need for such a policy is justifiable.

2

The Monroe Doctrine
In 1823, United States President James Monroe gave his first State of the Union
address to Congress, during which he outlined his foreign policy doctrine that would later
bare his namesake. 1 Though the U.S. in no capacity had the military power to enforce this
doctrine across North and South America, it represented a strategic shift in U.S. foreign
policy thinking; the old world, or European powers, should no longer attempt to interfere
or direct the new world. The Doctrine was steeped not only in the desire to prevent
European colonization, but also in the desire to increase trade, promote inter-American
mercantilism, and foster democratic governments. 2
The Monroe Doctrine was not just an affirmation of America’s previous
isolationist principles, it was the first assertion that as a growing power in the new world,
The United States would play a central role in shaping affairs in the Western hemisphere.
Just prior to this President Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, had
negotiated the Continental Treaty with Spain, effectively acquiring Spain’s claim on the
Pacific coast and removing the majority of Spanish power from the New World. 3 The
U.S. victory in the Mexica-American War in 1848, in which California, Arizona, New
Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Texas were ceded to the U.S., solidified the U.S.’s strength in
the North America. 4 With the purchase of Alaska from Russian in 1867, there became no
doubt that the U.S. was now the dominant force in the Americas, or a ‘new empire’ as
American historian Brooks Adams noted. 5

1

"Monroe Doctrine, 1823," Office of the Historian.
Ibid.
3
Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 46.
4
Ibid., 46.
5
Brooks Adams, The New Empire. New York: Macmillan, 1902.
2
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the United States began to shift its
foreign policy in the Americas. Washington’s policies pivoted from the sole acquisition
of territory, to the formation of a sphere of influence, with the purpose of further
cementing the growing economic and political hegemony in North and South America. 6
This pivot occurred for two main reasons: First, was the reality that there simply was very
little easy land to be obtained, the U.S. could no longer push small Indian tribes off vast
swaths of land or purchase land from declining powers. Further, the land that was
populated was inhabited with people that would not easily integrate into the Anglo-Saxon
society of the U.S., due to the racist doctrines of the time. 7 Second, the very nature of
global competition had changed; no longer was the greatness of a nation determined by
the expanse of its physical reach, commercial might, spurned by the Second Industrial
Revolution, began to signify superiority. 8
As the U.S. contented itself with expansion westward during the 1840’s, Great
Britain began to expand its interests into the small isthmus between North & South
America. Great Britain’s chargé d'affaires, Frederick Chatfield, was able to push British
citizen’s claims against the governments of the isthmus republics, resulting in special
trade treaties between the Great Britain and the republics. 9 Chatfield further pushed for
“British claims to the logging region in what is now Belize, to the Bay Islands off the
Honduran Coast, and to its self-proclaimed protectorate of the ill-defined Miskito

6

Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World. 3rd ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008. 27-28.
7
Ibid., 28.
8
Ibid., 28.
9
Thomas M. Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 1850-1903 Establishing a Relationship.
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999. 80.
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kingdom on Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast.” 10 These aggressive actions naturally left the
impression that Great Britain would move to territorialize the fledgling republics, so
much so that the Central American republics unsuccessfully appealed to the United States
to counter act the British advances multiple times. 11
The end of the Mexican-American War in 1848, which expanded U.S. territory to
the Pacific Ocean, and the subsequent discovery of gold in California, quickly changed
the previously apathetic attitude towards the isthmus. Now a route through the isthmus
that would provide quick movement for goods and military equipment was of massive
strategic importance. This signaled an awakening of sorts for U.S. foreign policy as the
U.S. government would now become increasingly concerned with Central American
politics and its effects on U.S. business interests. By the beginning of the 21st Century,
Central America would become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy.
Removing British Influence From Central America
Recognizing the danger that British encroachment and continued American nonintervention posed, President James K. Polk dispatched Ephraim G. Squier as a special
chargé d'affaires to all Central American states in 1849 to check the British presence in
Central America. 12 Squier traveled to Nicaragua and successfully signed a treaty that
granted the United States canal rights on the San Juan River, with the obligation of
guaranteeing its security. 13 Then Squier traveled to Honduras, where he secured a treaty

10

Ibid., 80.
William R. Manning, "Central America, 1831-1850." In Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States:
Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932. 160.
12
Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 82.
13
Ibid., 82.
11
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that ceded Tigre Island in the Gulf of Fonsaca to the United States, an area that was at the
time considered as a possible location for a trans-isthmus canal. 14
The British viewed the cession of the Tigre Islands as an unacceptable
encroachment on British interests in the region. Infuriated, British Minister Chatfield
ordered Royal Navy gunboats into the region to prevent the U.S. from seizing the
island. 15 Faced with the possibility of war, which neither nation particularly desired,
leaders in Washington and London were able to avoid the crisis through the ClaytonBulwer Treaty of 1850. The treaty specified that neither country could begin construction
on a transisthmian transportation route, construct fortifications in the area, or “occupy, or
fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over…any part of Central
America.” 16 It is important to note that the treaty was never discussed with the Central
American governments, and this would become a staple of U.S. negotiations in Latin
America.
The treaty temporarily cooled tensions between the two nations and avoided war,
but failed to resolve many of the regional tensions of Central America. The British
retained their claims in Belize, the Bay Islands, and the Miskito territory in Nicaragua
that extended as far south as the San Juan River. The river was prime importance, as it
served as the border with Costa Rica and one of the prime locations for a transisthmian
canal. The failure to resolve these issues would lead to a decade of diplomatic skirmishes
between the U.S. and Great Britain. 17

14

Ibid., 82.
Ibid., 82.
16
U.S. Department of State, “The Clayton Bulwer Treaty.” 1850.
17
Wilbur Devereux Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy, 1841-1861. Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1974. Chapter 5.
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The first of these skirmishes occurred in Nicaragua, as the country became a key
strategic interest after the discovery of gold, as it was the fastest way for fortune seekers
to travel west prior to the transcontinental railroad. Greytown, a British enclave on the
east coast of Nicaragua, became a focal point for Americans who used it as a landing
point for transisthmian travel and it saw a massive increase in American travelers. With
no entertainment or lodging for travelers, New York entrepreneur Commodore Cornelius
Vanderbilt stepped into to fill the void by forming the Accessory Transit Company. By
1852, roughly 10,000 Americans per month traveled to Greytown, enjoyed the
amusements, gambling houses, opulent hotels, and then took steamboats through the San
Juan River to the Pacific. 18 This massive influx of American citizens and trade would
result in another serious confrontation between the British and Americans.
According to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty Greytown was a free port, however, the
British badly needed revenue in order to fulfill the requirements of port municipal
services that had exponentially increased due to the explosion of American travelers. To
generate the needed revenue the British circumvented the law by charging harbor fees.
Vanderbilt refused to pay for the British harbor fees because his hotel and property were
across the bay and did not utilize any of Greytown’s harbors. The issue came to a head on
November 21, 1851, as Vanderbilt’s Prometheus began to depart the bay for New York
and refused to pay the British port fees. As a result, the British brig o’ war Express fired a
three shot volley across the bow of the Prometheus, an internationally recognized
warning to stop. 19

18
19

Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 82.
Ibid., 83.
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Vanderbilt, who was actually onboard the Prometheus at the time, agreed to pay
the fees, but as soon as the ship arrived in New York proceeded to lobby his case to the
U.S. government. Fillmore’s administration agreed with Vanderbilt and pressured the
British to make restitution and order its naval officers in Greytown to refrain from
pressing harbor fees until an official diplomatic agreement could be reached. 20 With its
interests in the region growing, the U.S. asserted that Great Britain had no legal authority
to exercise any sort of jurisdiction over U.S. merchant vessels not only in Greytown, but
also throughout Central America. Further, U.S. policymakers argued that the ClaytonBulwer treaty required the British to withdraw from the Miskito Coast. London was
willing to negotiate harbor fees, but refused to vacate any ground on the premise that the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty only prevented future colonization in Central America. 21
Despite this serious disagreement, Great Britain provided an opportunity for a
reasonable arrangement on the issues of the 1850 treaty; in 1851, Lord Palmerston
resigned as British foreign secretary over a disagreement on European politics,
consequently the short tempered Frederick Chatfield was recalled from Central America.
The rise of Napoleon and other European affairs severely distracted the British, who
sought a face saving solution for the Central American disputes. The U.S., despite its
growing internal strife that would eventually lead to a civil war, and much to the disdain
of the British, remained staunch in its determination to force the British from Central
America.

20

Ibid., 83.
Mario Rodríguez, “The "Prometheus" and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.” The Journal of Modern History 36
(3). University of Chicago Press, 1964. 270-71.

21
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The first prospect for an agreement came in 1852, when the Nicaraguan
government pursued control over the Miskito Kingdom. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster and British Minister John Crampton debated the issue in Washington and
London and eventually proposed a settlement in April 1852. 22 Under this proposal,
Greytown became a free city, the Miskito Indian’s would have their rights protected, and
the San Juan River would become the definitive boundary between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua. As had been the staple of U.S.-Great Britain negotiations and treaties, neither
the Costa Rican nor the Nicaraguan governments were consulted. Both countries
disagreed with the settlement due to the importance of the river in transisthmian trade,
and Nicaragua argued that continued British control of Greytown was a violation of the
Monroe Doctrine. London however, once again posited that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
only prevented future colonization in the isthmus, and did not affect current settlements. 23
Though the British appeared to begin backpedaling in Central America, they
remained staunch in their efforts to secure future political and commercial interests in the
region. In March 1852, the British issued a royal warrant declaring the Roatán, Bonacca,
and four islands off the coast of Honduras the “Colony of the Bay Islands.” 24 The British
issued the royal warrant under the false assumption that U.S. policy in the region focused
solely around a canal project. The British ignored the Honduran government’s protests
and the U.S. attitude solidified. The Senate Foreign Relations committee in Washington
met and concluded that the Bay Islands were an indivisible part of Honduras, and that
Britain should withdraw from Belize because it legally belonged to Guatemala. Further,
22

Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 83.
Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Central American Policy of Lord Palmerston, 1846-1848." The Hispanic
American Historical Review, 1936. 356-7.
24
Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 84.
23
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British interference in the region was not only a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
but also the Monroe Doctrine. 25
James Buchanan, the new U.S. Minister, arrived in London in September 1853
with the purpose of removing the British from the transisthmian region and Central
America itself. The British showed no signs of relenting, with Foreign Minister Villiers
describing British honor as requiring, “a paper regard for the interest and wellbeing of the
Misquitos because of the old connection with them,” and that the issue of the Bay Islands
was not up for discussion. 26 The U.S. would see no headway through diplomacy until the
end of the decade.
While the U.S. and Great Britain remained at a diplomatic impasse, their citizens
continued to clash in Central America, further heightening tensions. Americans continued
to travel through Greytown in ever larger numbers, and Commodore Vanderbilt’s estate
continued to swell in Punta Arenas, dominating both passenger and cargo traffic.
Vanderbilt continued to refuse to pay harbor fees, and in 1853, frustrated local British
officials took matters into their own hands and set fire to some of Vanderbilt’s buildings.
This incident would set a tumultuous foundation for the new U.S. minister to Nicaragua,
Solon Borland, who viewed British officials in Greytown as nothing more that “pirates
and outlaws” from Jamaica. 27 Minister Borland demanded the British provide financial
reparations for the destruction of Vanderbilt’s property and diplomatic immunity for
Captain T. T. Smith, who was wanted by the British for murder. The British naturally
refused Borland’s demands outright, so Borland stood by while Captain George N.
25

Ibid., 84.
Ibid., 84.
27
Ibid., 84.
26
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Hollins of the U.S. Navy commanded his warship, the Cyane, to bombard Greytown. 28
Though diplomatic officials of both countries looked down upon the event, no official
reparations took place and nothing ever came of it. The razing of Greytown marks a
turning point in U.S. foreign policy as it is the first use of gunboat diplomacy in Central
America.
The misplaced U.S. aggression did little to push the British out of Central
America; instead, the British appeared to double down. In 1856, the Honduran minister to
London, Pedro A. Herrán, settled an agreement that provided the Bay Islands as a free
state under Honduran sovereignty, with the purpose of providing protection to British
subjects in the region. Believing that all foreign influence should be removed from the
region, the Honduran government rejected the deal, yet the British remained on the Bay
Islands. 29
The British mistrust of U.S. aims in Central America steadily increased. Some
British believed that the U.S. government supported William Walker’s nearly successful
hostile takeover of Nicaragua. 30 The already tense diplomatic atmosphere increased when
President Buchanan avowed that the U.S. interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
the only correct one, and that the British were therefore illegally occupying the territory
in Central America. 31 The U.S. senate agreed, resolving that the British should abide by
the treaty or abrogate the territory. Concerning the U.S. aggression, Britain’s First Lord

28

James M. Woods, "Expansionism as Diplomacy: The Career of Solon Borland in Central America 18531854." The Americas 40, no. 3 (1984). 413.
29
Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 85.
30
T. J. Stiles, "The Filibuster King: The Strange Career of William Walker, the Most Dangerous
International Criminal of the Nineteenth Century." The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History.
31
James Buchanan, "First Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union." December 8, 1857.

11

of the Admiralty remarked: “We are fast drifting into war with the U[nited] States.” 32 At
this point the British stance on Central American policy becomes divided and seemingly
contradictory; Lord Clarendon emphasized that the British would not succumb to U.S.
jingoism, yet when saddled with the costs of the Crimean War seemed anxious to
withdraw from Latin America. Lord Clarendon told the U.S. minister to London, George
Dallas, that His Majesty’s government “would not give three coppers to retain any post
on the Central American Territory or coast from which she could not honorably retire.” 33
Faced with U.S. and local government opposition the British began to make
efforts to withdraw from Central America. In 1859, British Foreign Minister Lord John
Russell sent Charles Wycke to negotiate treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua. 34 Guatemalan dictator Rafael Carerra signed an agreement with Wycke that
would allow the British to construct a cart road connecting Guatemala’s interior to the
Caribbean coast. Wycke’s treaty with Honduras recognized the Honduran claim to the
Bay Islands on the condition that Honduras could not transfer the islands to any third
party or interfere with British subjects on the islands. In the final agreement in 1860, the
British and Nicaragua agreed that the Miskito coast, including Greytown, would become
sovereign Nicaraguan territory.
On the surface, these treaties provided a promising British free future for the
Central American governments, though in actuality the British would not be removed so
easily. Rather than withdrawing from Belize, the British incorporated it into their colonial
administrative system, christening it “British Honduras.” Further, the cart road from the
32

Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 85.
Ibid., 85.
34
Ibid., 85.
33
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coast to the interior of Guatemala was never constructed, causing a rift between the two
nations that would last even after Belize’s independence in 1981. 35
In Nicaragua, the British accused the Nicaraguan government of failing to grant
the Miskito Indians self-government, and in doing so refused to surrender their
protectorate over the Indian Territory. In the 1879 arbitration case to resolve the situation,
Emperor Franz Josef of Austria acknowledged the British control over the territory,
which eventually would lead to foreign investment. This would serve to only complicate
British interests in the area, by 1885, foreign entrepreneurs, many of them U.S.
Confederate expatriates, produced enough bananas to compete in U.S. markets ranging
from New Orleans to New York. 36 Within five years, upwards of 90 percent of the
regions wealth was controlled directly by U.S. citizens, with investments valued at $2
million. Three years later the trade between the U.S. and these plantations was valued at
$4 million.37 The area, in effect, became a colony of life in the Southern U.S.; private
clubs, restaurants, estates, and a bottling plant that produced various traditional American
drinks opened up.
The U.S. enclave would not last though; in 1894, Nicaraguan President José
Zelaya saw the region as a strong Nicaraguan economic asset, moved troops into the area,
and imposed martial law throughout the Miskito Territory. With contracts voided, and
export taxes levied, the U.S. businesses fared poorly and the U.S. government appealed to
Zelaya directly. When appeals failed Washington took no further actions because the

35

Ibid., 85; Wayne M. Clegern, "A Guatemalan Defense of the British Honduras Boundary of 1859." The
Hispanic American Historical Review 40, no. 4 (1960). 573-4.
36
Leonard, United States-Latin American Relations, 86.
37
Ibid., 86.
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expatriates were now technically residents of the foreign country and therefore subject to
its laws.
The British disagreed, citing the Nicaraguans failure to grant the Miskito Indians
self-government. In March 1894, British troops landed in Bluefields to protect the rights
of the Indians and British residents in the region. Though the British were clearly
violating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine, the officials in
Washington recognized that a forced removal of British presence would do more to
damage U.S. interests in the region than to protect U.S. citizens there. Washington
adopted a policy of chastisement without any actual interference.
As in the 1850s, Great Britain, faced with growing problems in Europe, and grew
weary of its commitment to the Miskito Indians. In the summer of 1894, the British
withdrew their ships and soldiers from Bluefields and allowed the Nicaraguans to expel
nearly 600 Jamaican administrators. 38 The Nicaraguan government, realizing that the
eyes of the U.S. and U.K. were upon them, implemented the terms of the 1860 treaty that
incorporated the Miskito Indians into the nation, and then went further to exempt them
from military service and personal taxes. The British withdraw pleased both the
Nicaraguans and Washington, though the Indians and residents remained at the mercy of
the Nicaraguan government.
Although U.S. diplomats and politicians claimed responsibility for the British
withdraw from the Bay Islands and the Miskito Coast, most of the responsibility belongs
more to an evolving British policy rather than masterful U.S. diplomacy. The British,
confronted with growing political changes on the European continent, became decidedly
38

Ibid., 87.
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less interested in far away and unprofitable colonies. The failure of the U.S. to enforce
the Monroe Doctrine on British territorial gains and actions in Nicaragua strengthened the
Central American judgement that the Monroe doctrine was merely a self-serving work of
rhetoric.
With the British withdrawal from Central America, the U.S. then faced two key
challenges to its sphere of influence in the Americas. The first was Europe’s tight
political control over the Caribbean: every island, save for Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, was controlled by the Spanish, British, French, or Dutch. 39 This stood as a
direct contestation of the Monroe Doctrine. The second challenge came from the
European’s commercial might in the Americas. While the U.S. maintained strong
economic influence in Cuba and Mexico, European nations held a strong hold on South
America. Argentina’s, Chile’s, and Peru’s largest trading partner was Great Britain, with
Brazil also importing the majority of its goods from there. Both Germany and France
maintained significant economic ties with Argentina and Brazil. 40 The economic
dominance of South America was so substantial that publicist William Eleroy Curtis
testified before U.S. Congress in 1886 that the rewards of economic growth in South
America were flowing almost wholly to “the three commercial nations of Europe,”
England, France and Germany, which “have secured a monopoly of the trade of Spanish
America…. [with] the Englishmen having the Brazilians by the throat.” 41
European investments in Latin America were similarly one sided towards
Europeans. The U.S. expended a previously unheard $5.2 billion in order to finance the
39

Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 28, 30.
Ibid., 28.
41
Ibid., 28.
40
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Civil War, incurring a 3,284% increase in the national debt. 42 During the early and mid19th century, the U.S. was in no place to export capital to Latin America. Great Britain
was more than willing to pick up the slack, maintaining long-term investments from
1870-1890. By 1914, Great Britain held more than half of all foreign investments in the
region. 43 The French and Germans also made significant capital investments just prior to
and after the turn of the century. 44
U.S. policy makers recognized that weak position that they were starting to put
themselves in and asserted that they would need to expand exports markets. In 1881, U.S.
Secretary of State James G. Blaine sought to expand the Monroe Doctrine with what
would later become recognized as the Big Brother Policy. This policy sought to turn the
Monroe Doctrine from a mere defensive weapon to keep the European powers out of the
Americas, to an active tool to assert U.S. hegemony over the Americas through
diplomatic collaboration and economic expansion. 45 Blaine recognized that in order to
bring about American dominance, the U.S. would have to cultivate “friendly commercial
relations with all American countries so as would lead to a large increase in the export
trade of the United States.” 46
The post-Civil War economic expansion offered a promising start to foreign
investment, increasing from an insignificant $392 million in 1870 to $1.3 billion by the
end of the 19thcentury. 47 Senator Albert J. Beveridge opened the Indiana Republican
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Campaign in 1898 with a powerful speech arguing the economic need for aggressive
American expansion, “...today we are raising more than we can consume. Today, we are
making more than we can use. Therefore, we must find new markets for our produce,
new occupation for our capital, new work for our labor.” 48 New avenues of investment
and increased trade were hoped to break the cycles of depression that had plagued the
U.S. 49

48
49

Albert Beveridge, "The March of the Flag." September 16, 1898.
Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 29.
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The Baltimore Crisis
The U.S. was not only interested in exorcising European influence, but also
establishing its own hegemony over the American nations. On October 16, 1891, on the
streets outside the True Blue Saloon in Valparaíso, Chile, a brawl between American
sailors from the USS Baltimore and Chilean nationals left two American sailors killed, 17
wounded (five seriously), and many arrested. 50 This seemingly inconsequential skirmish
would ignite a diplomatic crisis that would put the two nations on the path to a possible
war.
Strains in the U.S.-Chilean relationship dated back about a decade before the
Baltimore Affair. James G. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Garfield, supported
Peru over Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), accusing Chile of overt military
aggression encouraged by the British. 51 Chile would win the war, establishing its military
superiority in the Pacific coast of South America. With the desire to increase U.S. trade in
Latin America, Blaine was highly critical of British investment in Chile. Although
Chilean nationalists shared an anti-British sentiment with the U.S., they were still
extremely wary of American Motives.
When Chile became embroiled in a civil war in early 1891, the U.S. supported the
established Balmaceda government, while the British supported the rebels known as the
“Congressionalists.” In May 1891, the U.S., in response to a Balmacedan government
request, apprehended a Chilean rebel ship, the Itata, which was loaded with arms in San

50
51

Robert Kennedy, "The U.S.S. Baltimore Affair." N.Y. Times.
Ibid.
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Diego, California, and headed toward Chile. 52 When the Congressionalists won the war,
President Harrison released the Itata and recognized the Chilean government, but the
entire preceding string of events left a bitter taste in Chilean mouths.
Tension remained so high between the two rising powers that the U.S.
Department of the Navy drafted contingency plans in the event of war. U.S. Minister to
Chile, Patrick Egan, caused further friction by granting asylum to leaders of the defeated
Balmaceda faction, who were taking refuge in the American mission. 53 Egan refused
Chilean orders to hand over the refugees, and in October 1891, Chilean secret police
surrounded the mission to prevent the refugees’ escape.
In addition to the political turmoil, the U.S. and Chile were on an economic crash
course. By 1890, Chile had surpassed Peru as the most energetic and powerful
commercial nation in South America. 54 Further, Chile had the highest per capita income
of all nations in Latin America, and was exceeded on the European continent only by
Britain, Belgium and Holland in terms of per capita imports. 55 Following the revolution
Chile appeared the most politically stable Latin American nation, and with its excess of
natural resources, it was heavily favored by European investors.
By the beginning of the Baltimore Affair, the Chilean government looked upon
the U.S. government with a sense of loathing, and rightfully so; the American
government had supported the government they overtopped, criticized its largest trading
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partner, withheld weapons that could have shortened the civil war, and sheltered
members of the overtopped government.
The U.S. Navy in Chile
Valparaíso, at the time was a thriving commercial center and naval hub for South
America. After the Chilean civil war and the decline of the Peruvian port of Callo,
Valparaíso became the maritime capital of the Pacific, and a focus for naval enterprises
for continental defense. 56 North American traders frequented the port, and it grew into a
bustling, industrious, and prosperous city. As such, it was no surprise to see a ship of the
U.S. Pacific Squadron, such as the U.S. S. Baltimore, there in 1891.
The U.S.S Baltimore was not just any ship though, it was a considerable vessel
for its time. Displacing over 4,600 tons and sporting twelve breech-loading guns of
various sizes the Baltimore was one of three first-rate vessels in the U.S. Navy. Secretary
of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy proudly boasted of the Baltimore as “undoubtedly the
fastest ship of her displacement in the world. She can whip any that can catch her and run
away from any ship that can whip her.” 57 Captaining the Baltimore was Winfield Scott
Schley, Naval Academy graduate and future Rear Admiral. Schley was known as a
raconteur, unreserved, and enthusiastic with an inclination for impulsivity and eager for
action.
The Baltimore was one of several U.S. Navy ships ordered to Chilean waters
during the Revolution in January of 1891. Minister Eagan had asked for naval assets to
protect American interest during the tumultuous civil war. Captain Schley and the
Baltimore steamed from France to Valparaiso, where Schley reported that the presence of
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the Baltimore gave satisfied and contributed to the security of Americans living in
Chile. 58 Rear Admiral W. P. McCann, commander of the U.S.S. Pensacola and U.S.
naval forces in the South Pacific, corroborated Schley’s statement when he cabled
Secretary Tray that the “arrival of the Baltimore on this station has attracted a great deal
of attention, and has also had a very good effect in increasing the respect of these people
for our navy and showing them that the United States had the power to protect the
interests of her citizens should it become necessary to do so.” 59
The Baltimore remained in Valparaiso throughout the civil war, taking no action,
acting as a not so subtle reminder that of U.S. interest. The Congressionalists victory
Battle of Placilla on August 28 and overthrew the Balmaceda government should have
lessened the need for a U.S. warship. Rear Admiral Brown telegraphed Tracy, explaining
that a “perfect order” existed between Santiago and Valparaiso and that naval warships
would not improve the situation. 60 Despite this, Captain Schley was ordered not to move
and the Baltimore remained in Valparaiso.
Sailors and Natives Clash

Friday, October 16, 1891, clear skies and gentle breezes prevailed in Valparaiso,
and 117 crewmembers from the Baltimore were granted a twenty-four hour liberty.
Because of the civil war, the crew had not been granted shore leave since late July or
early August in Coquimbo, unlike the crews of foreign naval vessels who had received

58

Ibid., 22.
Message of the President of the United States Respecting the Relations with Chile, Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1892. 247.
60
Ibid., 288.
59

21

liberty throughout the civil war in Valparaiso. 61 When the Baltimore had returned to
Valparaiso on September 14, the captain of the Valparaiso Port Authority and the senior
Chilean naval officer in the port visited the Baltimore to render the traditional welcome,
courtesies, and hospitalities. Captain Schley had question the Intendente, Juan de Dios
Arlegüi, about the possibility of shore leave, and Arlegüi replied that he could find no
reason to withhold a privilege that was being enjoyed by other crews. 62 Despite this,
Schley cabled Tracy that he felt “strong feeling and great hostility” against Americans,
and that although everything was quiet, the threat of what might happen had prevented
him from granting liberty. 63 It was not until over a month later that Schley believed he
saw a change in Chilean attitude and reported, “Everything is quiet at Valparaiso, and the
chances of everything being more settled improve daily.” 64 Only then did he deem it safe
for his sailors to go ashore and granted them liberty.
Unfortunately, this was not the case, and the riot outside the True Blue Saloon
killed two sailors and wounded many others. President Harrison, who was already upset
over the refugee dispute, became deeply angered when news of the casualties trickled in.
The United States government demanded, "Prompt and full reparation proportionate to
the gravity of the injury inflicted," from Chile. 65 The Chilean foreign minister, Manuel
Matta, responded by promising nothing until the judicial process was completed. Both
sides blamed the altercation on the other, though some Americans believed that it was a
deliberate planned assault on American sailors. The prolonged length of the judicial
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investigation upset many Americans, who interpreted as a refusal to accept responsibility,
express the expected regret, punish the murderers, and make reparations for the death of
U.S. service members. 66
The tense situation temporarily cooled for a few weeks until inflammatory
remarks on each side brought the controversy to the forefront of international politics. In
the President’s 1891 State of the Union address in December, President Harrison blamed
the Baltimore affair on Chile and criticized the “couched offensive tone” of Chilean
Foreign Affairs Secretary Matta. 67 Two days later Secretary Matta publicly responded,
declaring the American government was insincere, wrong, and bellicose in its treatment
of the Baltimore affair. 68 This outright rebuke of the U.S. government further incensed
President Harrison, and Eagan broke off all communication with the Chilean government.
European Noninvolvement

The European powers watched the events with concern as the U.S. pushed closer
to war with Chile, who the Europeans regarded as the most prominent civilized and free
nation in South America. 69 President Harrison threatened war in an ultimatum sent to
Chile on January 23, 1892, and then again in a special message to Congress on January
25, after the Chilean government had yet to respond to the earlier ultimatum. The Chilean
minister in Paris, Augusto Matte, believed that the “influence that the European press
exercises on public opinion in the United States,” could help quell the calls for war. 70
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Through careful maneuvering Matte was able to ensure that the most prominent European
newspapers favored the Chilean side, relying upon the sympathy for the rising
democracy, and the “disfavor that the United States has in Europe due to its economic
policy.” 71
Minister Matte even arranged to meet James Gordon Bennet, who owned the New
York Herald, and lived in Paris, to discuss how European media might affect the
international relationships of the U.S. Despite all of Matte’s efforts, there was no change
in U.S. actions; the conversation with Bennet proved ineffective, and though the
Europeans showed sympathy for the Chileans, they advised Chile to avoid conflict with
the U.S. no matter the merits of the Chilean position. Despite Le Temps, Les Debates, La
Justice, and Le Soir publishing editorials condemning the war hawk U.S. diplomacy, the
French remained firm in their desire to remain uninvolved.
Foreign nations, who recognized the merit of the Chilean position, refused to even
mediate the conflict between the two nations. Matte reported to the Chilean Ministry of
Exterior Relations, that Britain would not mediate due to “accented animosities” toward
the U.S.; Germany would not due to “serious” differences with North America; and Italy
was unable to due to pending questions concerning the New Orleans lynching (in which
in 1890 U.S. citizens had stormed a prison in New Orleans and murdered several Italians
who had just been found innocent of killing the city police chief). 72 Spain, as the parent
country of Chile, was unable to mediate the conflict as it looked “with vivid repugnance
on United States intervention in South America.” 73 The Swiss minister advised the Swiss
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government that the notion of war over the Baltimore affair as an “absurdity” since the
North American public seemed hesitant to go to war, but that it remained a possibility, as
Chile seemed unwilling to make any sort of concessions. The Brazilian minister,
Salvador de Medoça, made an effort to get his government to mediate the conflict, but the
Brazilian government declined to do so.
Of any European power that would intervene, Germany was one of the few that
showed the most promise. The Chilean minister in Berlin, Gonzalo Bulnes, had meetings
with Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, German Minister of State, who had reports from
the German minister in the U.S. that a war between Chile and the U.S. was imminent. 74
Bieberstein concluded that the U.S. was motivated by a desire for commercial monopoly
of South America, with the Baltimore affair acting merely as a pretext for excluding
European economic activity and replacing it with U.S. activity. Minister Bulnes reasoned
that the Chilean cause of defending a countries sovereign commercial interests was also
defending European investors interests, and therefore worthy of support. Indeed, the
former chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, had stated with amazement, “A nation as powerful
as the American Union did not show more moderation and respect for a nation as small as
Chile, that had just come out of a civil war, and insisted in imposing on it the same
qualities that they condemned in the riot.” 75 Despite these promising signs of support,
Bieberstein made it clear that it was squarely on Chile’s shoulders to weather the conflict,
and that though the German government sympathized with the Chilean cause, no concrete
aid would be provided. Bieberstein reasoned that the U.S. was clearly “seeking the
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pretext for a war” and that Chile should do everything in its power to thwart the
fabrication of a casus belli. 76
The British also showed a marked interest with the Chilean government in the
Baltimore affaire. The British Foreign office first believed that the trouble had been a
result of Minister Egan’s appointment, which had been regarded with great displeasure
by the Chilean government, or that the entire conflict was a result of actions that neither
side had control over. 77 The affair was thought to be so unsubstantial that the London
Times reported on October 30, “little or no excitement has been caused in official
circles.” 78 John Kennedy, the British minister to Chile, described the Baltimore affair as,
“merely a question of temper.” 79
Though viewed as a question of temper, the British still remained concerned that
over the affair. Kennedy wrote the Foreign Office that,
Mr. Egan and Captain Schley have changed their previous prudent attitude for one
of defiance; this may be explained by their conviction that patience and prudence
under direct insults to the United States Flag have been in vain and that the best
way to put an end to the systematic annoyance to which they have been subjected
was by obtaining authority to defy and threaten the Chilean government. 80
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Captain Schley’s “probably exaggerated language to his foreign colleagues at
Valparaiso” worried Kennedy so greatly that he recommended the return of British war
ships to the coast. 81
By December 31, the Foreign Office had realized the magnitude of the situation,
and suggested that Chilean Foreign Minister Manuel Antonio Matta be removed from
office for the aggressive and undiplomatic note that he had sent the U.S. in December, for
fear that the two countries would go to war otherwise. Minister Kennedy had tried, in
vein, to persuade Matta to use more tactile language in order to introduce friendliness and
calm between the two nations. Kennedy predicted that because of Matta’s failure, his
successor would “certainly be compelled to drop the defiant attitude hitherto observed
toward the United States and also to make concessions to the demands of that Country.” 82
The British certainly sympathized with Chile (due in no small part to their massive
economic interests in the area), but as with the other European powers, would not start or
join a campaign against the United States.
The Crisis Ends

On January 1, 1892, Kennedy’s prediction proved true, the Chilean administration
replaced Matta with a more peacemaking foreign minister, Luis Pereira. Pereira met
courteously with Egan and agreed to have the secret police removed and allow the
refugees to leave Chile without threat of arrest. On January 6, the Chilean court
investigating the affair indicted three Chileans and an American for their involvement in
the affair.
81
82

Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 29.

27

As the diplomatic dispute began to wind down the Chilean government once
again fanned the flames as it asked that Egan be removed as the U.S. Minister. President
Harrison reacted quickly, sending a threateningly worded message to Chile, rejecting the
Chilean court’s findings, labeling the Baltimore incident as a deliberate attack on
American service personnel, ruling out the discussion on Mr. Egan’s position, and
demanding, “A suitable apology and…adequate reparation for the injury done to this
government.” 83 President Harrison presented the correspondence to Congress, with the
aim of gearing the government to war.
On January 25, 1892, the Chilean administration, at the entreaty of European
ministers for fear of war, conceded on all of President Harrison’s points. In February, a
Chilean court gave prison sentences for the three Chilean rioters, and in July, the Chilean
government agreed to pay the United States $75,000 in gold bullion as reparation. 84
Minister Egan would remain until President Cleveland fired him in 1893 for again
offering asylum during another Chilean civil war. Thus, the hegemony of the U.S. in
American politics was further cemented in the minds of Europeans and Latin American
Governments.
U.S. Naval Machinations

Unknown to the Chileans, but certainly bearing on the affair, the U.S.S. Baltimore
itself was representative of an effort by the U.S. to build a new navy of considerable
scope, second to none. The goal of becoming a world class naval power did not start with
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the Republican administration that had ascended to office in March 1889, but the
articulation of strong naval principles and organization of public opinion distinguished
President Harrison and Secretary Tracy as the founding fathers of the “new navy” and
American expansionism.
As the U.S. sought to improve its international position and looked to establish
itself as the dominant nation in the hemisphere, it came to the realization that its navy
was dwarfed and embarrassed by nations considered of lesser status, like Chile. 85 In
1884, Senator Eugene Haile of Maine described the U.S. Navy with “a sense of shame...
There is nothing whatever to prevent Chile or any other South American power which
has in its possession...a second or third rate ironclad from steaming along the Pacific
coast and laying our towns under contribution, and burning and destroying." 86 In 1881,
the Secretary of the Navy, William H. Hunt, reported to Congress that unless it took
action the navy would spiral into insignificance: "We have been unable to make such an
appropriate display of our naval power abroad as will cause us to be respected. The
exhibition of our weakness in this important arm of defense is calculated to detract from
our occupying in the eyes of foreign nations that rank to which we know ourselves to be
justly entitled.” 87 President Arthur recognized the deplorable state of the U.S. Navy and
signed a bill appropriating funds for the Navy’s first steel vessels, one of which the
U.S.S. Baltimore. 88
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President Arthur’s decision was do in no small part to the awareness of the state
of the U.S. Navy in the Americas. Each of the two British built Chilean ironclads that
fought in the War of the Pacific in 1879 were considered superior to that of any vessel in
the U.S. Naval arsenal. 89 In 1885, Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler, in his
annual report to congress, mentioned the new Chilean steel cruiser Esmerelda, describing
it as the “most perfect ship of her class ever built… [a] more formidable vessel than
either the Boston or Atlanta…unsurpassed as a cruising commerce destroyer.” 90 Just
before arriving in Washington, Theodore Roosevelt wrote President Harrison that “it is a
disgrace to us as a nation that we should have no war ships worth of the name, and that
our rich sea-board cities should lie at the mercy of a tenth rate country like Chili [sic].”91
Secretary Tracy realized that even after his plans for expansion were executed
successfully, the U.S. would be “absolutely at the mercy of states having less than onetenth of its population, one-thirtieth of its wealth, and one-one hundredth of its area.” 92
The disgraceful state of the U.S. Navy was not only noticed by government officials,
Scientific American lamented, “We have no navy worthy of the name, and nearly all our
seaports are without proper defenses… at the mercy of any single piratical boat that
chooses to enter. This is a very humiliating position for a country like ours to be placed
in.” 93
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The U.S. Navy, in 1890, was still far behind Britain, France, Russia, and
Germany, and even lesser powers as, such as the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Turkey,
China, Norway-Sweden, and Austria-Hungary. 94 The early 1880’s push for naval funds
and subsequent building did pay off though; by the end of Benjamin Harrison’s
presidency, the U.S. navy had advanced in tonnage and ship numbers from twelfth to
about fifth place. 95 This evolution from weakness to strength was achieved through the
leadership of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy, who is credited with the rebirth of
the Naval Department and the advocacy of a “two-ocean navy.” 96 Through his vigor and
efficiency, Secretary Tracy was able to gain the loyalty of his subordinates and the trust
of the navy. Tracy recognized the importance of public approval; upon the
commissioning U.S.S. Chicago, the largest U.S. cruiser at the time, Tracy sent it and its
two sister cruisers, the U.S.S. Atlanta and the U.S.S. Boston, to ports along the Atlantic
seaboard, where the public marveled at the display of naval technology. 97 Secretary
Tracy then set the precedent of naming new battleships after states and new cruisers after
cities, a policy that still holds to this day. 98 Arguably, Secretary Tracy’s greatest
achievement was not the mere increase in tonnage, but the development of naval yards
capable of turning out warships that could compete with the best of any naval power. 99
Secretary Tracy pushed for the buildup of the U.S. Navy not because of the
Baltimore affair, but because of those kinds of incidents; Tracy believed that the U.S. had
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a need to display its naval power so that the world would pay the proper attention to the
growing power of the U.S. The Baltimore affair was an indication the change in policy
that was occurring: the U.S. would now win prestige, respect, and power status through
aggressive assertion. The extensive preparations for war even prior to the ultimatum
further support this.
In the 1890s, the most powerful nations on their respective continents were Chile
and the U.S. The Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific set it up as the primary naval
power in the America’s, while the U.S. pursued the expansion of its economic and
strategic influence. The U.S. sought to assert its hegemony in the western hemisphere and
cement its reputation in the world through threats of war. By the end of the crisis, it was
clear that the final page of the isolationism chapter in America’s history had been turned,
and a new, aggressive United States had emerged.

32

The Spanish American War
The aggressive rhetoric in Chile was just a glimpse of future U.S. foreign policy
in Latin America. As the European powers began to relinquish control of the Americas,
the U.S. rushed in to fill the economic and political void. By the turn of the 20th century,
the U.S. would become embroiled in a war with Spain over Cuba, and the ensuing
occupation of the largest island in the Gulf of Mexico.
By the midway point of the 19th century, Cuba was deep in the throes of
insurrection, a time of constant conspiracies and rumors that would never come to
fruition. The future of Cuba was uncertain, and economic difficulties contributed to
island wide feelings of discontent. Cuban Creoles were deeply dissatisfied with Spanish
rule, as Spain had imposed seemingly arbitrary taxes, discriminatory tariffs, and other
levees that were viewed as purposefully harmful to the growing level of trade between
the U.S. and Cuba. 100 This economic conflict would eventually become the main point of
contention between the peninsular authorities and the Creole producers. The divide was
magnified further as the U.S. overtook Spain as Cuba’s primary trading partner.
This divide became apparent in both Cuba and the U.S., causing annexationists
movements to gain steam in the 1840’s and 50’s. As expansionist sentiment garnered
popularity, political pressure followed; in 1848, President James K. Polk offered $100
million to Spain for Cuba, and then President Franklin Pierce raised the sum to $130
million in 1854, once again without success. After this second refusal, the U.S. ministers
to Spain, France, and England met in Ostend, Belgium to publicly urge the U.S. to
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continue its efforts to purchase Cuba. The Ostend Manifesto, as it would later become
known as, warned Spain that if it refused to sell Cuba then it could be expected that, “by
every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we
possess the power.” 101
The U.S. annexation efforts did not go unnoticed in Cuba, and in part increased
Cuban expectations and encouraged hope of imminent annexation. The Cubans viewed
the Texan annexation with a glimmer of hope, as the Texas settlers had seceded from
Mexico and joined the U.S. These efforts would ultimately fizzle out, as the U.S. became
increasingly focused on difficult domestic issues. Once the U.S. Civil War drew to a
close it became clear that Cuba, a slave territory, would not fit into the Union as
seamlessly as some previously suggested. Evolving domestic policies made it unlikely
that Cuba would be assimilated into the United States.
Sentiments and conditions evolved in Cuba during this time as well. The fervent
support for annexation that had petered out left many Cubans disillusioned, with resigned
support. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 had a profound effect on Cuban
sugar planters, who had looked at annexation as a way to save slavery in Cuba. After the
Civil War the sugar planters became some of the most vocal critics of U.S. annexation for
the same reasons.
While the U.S. was in the midst of reconstruction, Cuba became engrossed in its
own internal problems. A new conservative ministry in Spain created waves of
antidemocratic laws in Cuba. Opposition journalists were silenced, critics exiled,
meetings of any political nature were strictly prohibited, and any outspoken opponents
101
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were imprisoned. At the same time, Spain re-imposed old taxes and levied new ones,
imposing strict protectionist duties on foreign goods that amounted to four times the price
of Spanish goods. These duties were particularly burdensome on the Cubans, who relied
heavily upon foreign goods, and caused further harm when the U.S. counter levied a 10
percent tariff on Cuban goods. 102
Steep new taxes are inconvenient at any time, but were especially problematic
during this time. The taxes directly caused the Cuban economy to plunge into a deep
recession: sugar production plummeted causing sugar prices to fall to their lowest point
in fifteen years. 103 Then, in December of 1868, the major banks on Cuba withheld
payments, bringing sugar payments to a halt, and further contributing to the pervasive
climate of uncertainty. 104
The Creoles, discontent with the economic uncertainty and without the likelihood
of gaining relief through reforms, began to rise in popularity and seek remedy through
revolution. By 1868, established representatives of eastern Cuban creole bourgeoisie,
"cattle barons from Camagüey and sugar planters from Oriente-Carlos Manuel de
Céspedes, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Francisco Vicente Aguilera, Bartolomé Masó,
Pedro Figueredo, and Ignacio Agramonte" were deeply involved in anti-Spanish
conspiracies. 105
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The First Cuban War for Independence
On October 10, 1868, the Grito de Yara (Ten Years War) kicked off a
revolutionary period in Cuba that called for complete independence from Spain. The
rebellion quickly expanded from east to west; spreading first throughout the Oriente
province, then west into Camagüey, and eventually reaching nearly halfway across the
island into the east of the Las Villas province. By the early 1870s, the creole uprising had
gained more than 40,000 supporters. 106
From the outset, the U.S. took a dim view of the rebellion and pursued a two
pronged policy approach with Cuba: oppose Cuban independence and support Spanish
sovereignty. The U.S., unable to acquire Cuba from Spain, resigned itself to an
alternative approach to Cuban annexation; Cuba could remain outside of the U.S. only as
long as it remained a Spanish territory. This principle, which came to be known as "no
transfer," would become the bedrock for U.S.-Cuban policy in the second half of the
nineteenth century. The “no transfer” principal was based upon numerous corollary
tenants, the chief of which was a U.S. commitment to defend the Spanish sovereignty
against challengers, internal as well as external. 107 U.S. officials firmly believed that
Cuban annexation was only a matter of time as long Cuba remained under Spanish rule
and did not pass to any third party. Spanish sovereignty over the island played into U.S.
interests, it was considered a temporary necessity for the anticipated eventual transfer of
the island into U.S. hands.
The decay of Spanish control over Cuba was viewed by many in the United States
as a final act of turmoil that would result in the annexation of Cuba. Throughout the 19th
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century the U.S. had maintained the status quo and defended the Spanish claim over the
island from both internal and external challengers, if only for the eventual goal of
securing the island. In 1823, Thomas Jefferson advised President James Monroe to
"oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any power, either as auxiliary,
stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially [Cuba's] transfer to
any power, by conquest, cession or in any other way." 108 Two decades later, Secretary of
State John Forsyth instructed the U.S. minister in Madrid to reassure the Spanish
government that "in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this
portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of
the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it." 109 In 1849, Secretary of State
John M. Clary reiterated the U.S. policy on a non-Spanish Cuba: "The news of the
cession of Cuba to any foreign power would, in the United States, be the instant signal for
war." 110
The notion that Spain would eventually cede Cuba to the United States was
predicated on the maintenance of Spanish colonial rule. Until Spain itself proved
incapable of governing the island, the U.S. would support Spanish sovereignty over the
island as an effective alternative to annexation. Guaranteeing Cuba’s “independence
against all the world except Spain,” Thomas Jefferson asserted, “would be nearly as
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valuable to us as if it were our own.” 111 Later the U.S. minister to Spain, John Forsyth,
would further assure the Spanish that the U.S. “interests required, as there was no
prospect of [Cuba] passing into our hands, that it should belong to Spain.” 112
Throughout the Ten Years War (1868-78), the Cuban insurgency appealed to the
U.S. for belligerency status, but was consistently denied. President Ulysses S. Grant
asserted that recognition of the Cuban provisional government would be, “impracticable
and indefensible,” and that the granting of belligerent status would be, “unwise and
premature.” 113 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish had serious concerns over the intellectual
and moral quality the Cuban population of Indians, Africans, and Spaniards and doubted
their ability to self-govern. 114 While Fish comprehended that Cuban independence from
Spain was eventually inevitable, the proposition that the separation would result in Cuban
sovereignty was quite a different matter, and was heavily resisted in Washington.
Because of these policies and assurances, the United States sustained its
commitment to Spanish sovereignty throughout the Ten Years War. However, the U.S.
urged the Spanish to consider reforms to appeal to the Cubans and to end the war with
Spanish control over the island control. President Grant even offered to mediate an
agreement between the creole insurgents and the Spanish in order to maintain colonial
rule in exchange for reform.
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Though the U.S. remained unwilling to consider annexation with the Cubans, it
continued to try to negotiate with the Spanish for the acquisition of the island itself.
Secretary Fish presumed that a prolonged and destructive war in Cuba would make Spain
realize that the cost of keeping the island was too great and Spain then would part with
the island. In a cabinet meeting in April 1869, Secretary of State Fish asserted that the
Cuban revolt would expose the "madness and fatuity" of Spain's continued control over
the island. Eventually, the revolt would produce "a condition of affairs, a state of feeling
that would compel all the civilized nations to regard the Spanish rule as an international
nuisance, which must be abated, when they would all be glad that we should interpose
and regulate control of the Island." 115 Throughout the insurrection, the Grant
administration made continuous inquiries and offers to purchase the island.
By the late 1870’s, however, the Spanish were establishing military superiority
and ending the war. During the closing period of the conflict, Spain discussed with the
Cubans the terms of political reconciliation, promising reforms that would eventually act
as the foundation of the peace settlement. Under the Pact of Zanjón, signed in February
1878, the Spanish committed to political reforms and economic concessions, with the
insurgents agreeing to lay down their arms in return for amnesty. 116
Integration into the U.S. Economy
The Ten Years War marked a turning point for Cuba during the nineteenth
century. After 1878, Spain worked to remedy some of the structural sources of Cuban
disgruntlement, abolished the slave trade, and improved trade policies. In 1884 and 1886,
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the Spanish negotiated limited reciprocal trade agreements with the U.S. to eliminate the
differential flag system and some of the most burdensome import duties and levies. The
political reforms started promisingly, and early indications pointed to Spain actually
making good on its commitment to institute colonial reforms.
Despite this, as some of the more pronounced contradictions of the colonial
economy started to become more noticeable it gave rise to a new direction for the pursuit
of Cuban sovereignty. The Ten Years War had a prolonged influence on Cuban internal
development and international relations in the years that followed. The disruption of
Cuban sugar production throughout the war had allowed sugar producers elsewhere to
seize upon the lack of supply and expand. Sugar cane production had increased across
Latin American and Asia, and beet sugar production had expanded in Europe, resulting in
a robust challenge to the former Cuban monopoly of sugar on the world market. 117
This challenge would lead to economic crisis in Cuba. With the sugar prices
collapsing, the island saw its primary source of income dwindle, resulting in a deep
depression. Seven of Cuba’s largest trading corporations went under, the islands banks
closed, and the business houses collapsed. In the first quarter of 1884, the Cuban business
failures amounted to more than $7 million. 118
The freefall of the Cuban economy provided a ripe opportunity for U.S. economic
expansion into the colonial economy. For about a hundred years, the Cuban economy had
been structuring and developing itself around a close commercial relationship with the
U.S., becoming increasingly dependent on U.S. markets, capital, and imports. This
economic relationship had molded Cuban production strategies, swayed local goods and
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consumption, and inevitably, the trajectory of Cuban politics. By 1878, the U.S.
economic relation had shaped the Cuban economy to assume new forms and functions;
Cuban producers were desperate for new sources of capital and credit, which were
unavailable from Spanish banks or creditors. The Cubans then turned towards the U.S.
with long term, permanent consequences. Credit transactions between the U.S. and Cuba
increased in both volume and value throughout the 1880s, and helped many organizations
stave off bankruptcy119
The prevention of bankruptcy was only temporary though, and the economic
climate on the island did not improve. This led many of the Cuban planters to slide back
into bankruptcy and lose their property to U.S. investors. In the last two decades of the
nineteenth century, through initial foreclosures and subsequent sales by planters in
financial trouble, U.S. ownership of property in Cuba expanded. Despite many of the
planters surviving the crisis during the 1880s, they paid for their survival at the cost of
their traditional supremacy over the production process. The price of meeting their longterm financial commitments was increasing displacement and eventual dependency on
the U.S. financial market. Across Cuba, the grip of the creole planter classer over
production and distribution slipped, foreshadowing the classes’ eventual demise.
The province of Cienfuegos serves as a prime example of the transformation that
was taking place in colonial sugar production. In 1883 U.S. Consul William P. Pierce
reported that,” For the last ten or fifteen years, every sugar estate in the jurisdiction of
Cienfuegos has either changed ownership by reason of debt or is now encumbered with
debts to an amount approximating the value of the estate.” Pierce specified that the
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Cuban planter had borrowed heavily from U.S. investors despite exorbitant interest rates
in order to “obtain more capital to preserve that which he had,” because the planters
believed that “it was the only plank that [they] could hope to float through his troubles.”
Pierce unsympathetically concluded that the “planter…has so far failed in his calculations
and he may lose the title to his estate. 120
Pierce’s conclusions did not take long to come to fruition. Starting in early 1884,
Edwin Atkins and Company based in Boston foreclosed on the Soledad estate owned by
Juan Sarria, the Carlota plantation from the Ramón de la Torriente family, the Caledonia
estate from the heirs of Diego Juláin Sánchez, the Guábairo property from Manuel
Blanco, the Linomes farm from the Vilá family, and the Brazo estate from the Torre
family. The impoverished Carlos Iznaga family sold Vega Vieja, Manaca, and leased
Algoba to Atkins. Atkins then purchased the Santa Teresa plantation from Juan Pérez
Galdos, Veguitas from José Porrúa, Vaquería from the Barrallaza family, the San
Augustín estate from Tómas Terry, and the Rosario farm from Juan Sarria. The Atkins
family was then able to secure long-term leases on San José, Viamones, and San
Esteban. 121 These are just a handful of examples of an individual organization acquiring
large swaths of land in Cuba, numerous companies and investors were expanding all
throughout the island. Eaton Stafford and Company, a New York banking firm, acquired
several sugar estates between Cienfuegos and Trinidad. U.S. merchant William Steward
acquired the 4,500-acre La Carolina estate. Then, in 1892, the American Refining
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Company acquired the Trinidad Sugar Company. The E. & L. Ponvert brothers from
Boston obtained the 4,000-acre Hormiguero estate in Palmira, then either bought out or
foreclosed on the surround properties to increase their land. 122
Throughout the last few decades of the nineteenth century, the U.S. expanded its
presence in Cuba in all directions, from Havana and the provinces, to all sectors of the
economy. U.S. citizens did not just invest in Cuba; they took up residence there,
broadening their roles and importance. They arrived and managed sugar mills, oversaw
the construction of railroads and mines, and farmed the land. Further, U.S. capital
expanded into the local economies, which included sugar plantations, mines, cattle
ranches, coffee estates, and commercial organizations. U.S. citizens began establishing
trading companies and boarding houses to increase profits. U.S. citizens with specialized
skills began flocking to the budding island, moneylenders, shippers, engineers, and
machinists arrived to operate and service the industrial equipment that was now being
imported regularly from the United States. The modern steam-powered mill machinery,
steamboats, and railroads increased productivity and profits, further reinforcingt the U.S.
control over Cuban resources.
The strengthening of the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba linked the Cuban
company closely with the U.S.’s. The economic crisis during the 1880’s both exemplified
and reinforced this linkage; as the world price of sugar sharply declined with the price of
new competitors, the Cubans began seeking a secure place in the U.S. markets on as
favorable terms as possible. 123
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The growth of the beet sugar industry in France, Austria, and Germany during the
1870s and 80s displaced the primary Cuban export from the European markets. In 1854,
beet sugar accounted for only 14 percent of the total world production of sugar; however,
by 1884 it grown to 53 percent of the international supply. 124 This left the U.S., by
proximity and demand, as the only market with the capacity to absorb the now excess
Cuban production.
During these years, the Cuban economy changed structurally due to the U.S.
connection. Cuban production strategies, consumption patterns, and political alignments
evolved to reflect the commercial ties with the U.S. The reorientation of trade away from
Spain, and towards the U.S., exposed some of the contradictions in colonialism and
confirmed that Cuban expansion could no longer be contained within the Spanish
colonial structure. Though the Spanish government strained to accommodate the
transformations that were taking place in Cuba, it became increasingly apparent that it
was incapable of coping with the situation. Spain could not provide the capital, financing,
shipping, and technology to continue Cuba’s growing trade and production.
The implications of Spain’s inability to provide were not ambiguous; the Spanish
involvement in the Cuban economy was quickly diminishing due to the lack of material
resources and technical knowledge that was required to continue driving the Cuban
economy. Cuban economic growth had been swift, in some regions spectacular, and the
production techniques and industrial innovations imported from the U.S. had transformed
key sectors of the Cuban economy. 125
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Meanwhile, the U.S. investors continued to expand throughout the different areas
of the Cuban economy. The major Cuban cities had U.S. companies operating utilities
services. The U.S. companies control over the mineral resources of the Cubans also
expanded. The Bethlehem Steel Corporation out of Pennsylvania created the Juraguá Iron
Company Ltd. and the Ponupo Manganese Company, in Santiago de Cuba. The Spanish
American Iron Company (Pennsylvania Steel Company) managed manganese and nickel
mines throughout the island. The Sigua Iron Company seized control of the mining
industry near El Caney. In 1892 alone, more than $875,000 of iron ore was shipped to
U.S. cities from the port of Santiago de Cuba. 126
The U.S. takeover of Cuban utilities and industries was both a product and a
foreshadowing of evolving colonial relationships. In ten years, the Cuban economy,
revitalized with U.S. capital and dependent upon U.S. imports, had completely
restructured itself around the U.S. economy. In the early 1880s, 94 percent of Cuba’s
total sugar production was exported directly to the United States. By the 1890s, U.S.
companies investment in Cuba was tallied at around $50 million (roughly $1.3 billion in
today’s dollars), but in fact could have been much higher. 127 U.S. Consul Ramón noted in
1882 that:
De facto, Cuba is already inside the commercial union of the United States…The
Island is now entirely dependent upon the market of the United States, in which to
sell its sugar cane products; also the existence of the sugar plantations, the
railroads used in transporting the products of the plantations in the shipping ports
of the island, the export and import trades of Cuba based thereon, each including
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hundreds of minor industries, such as the agricultural and mechanical trades, store
houses, wharves, lighters, stevedores, brokers, clerks and bankers, real estate
owners, and shopkeepers of all kinds, and holders of the public debt, are now all
directly related to the market of the United States to the extent of 94 percent of
their employment. 128
The increasing reliance on U.S. markets in Cuban had two immediate
consequences. The Cuban local governments demanded a higher level of autonomy and
control over trade and commerce regulations. Second, Madrid was further pressured to
negotiate a trade deal with the U.S. that provided favorable terms for the Cuban
producers and consumers.
In 1891, Madrid gave in; the Foster-Cánovas agreement was signed by both
countries, giving Cuba preferential access to U.S. markets in return for Spanish tariff
concessions on U.S. imports. The effects of the agreement were dramatic; sugar
production in Cuba expanded spectacularly from 632,000 tons in 1890, to 976,000 tons in
1982, and reached a historic peak of one million tons in 1894. 129
The 1891 agreement only further encouraged U.S. investment in Cuban sugar
production companies. In 1892, the American Refining Company acquired the Trinidad
Sugar Company. In 1893, a conglomerate of New York sugar merchants created the
Tuinucú Cane Sugar Company and established sugar operations in Sancti-Spíritus in
central Colombia. A collection of New Jersey investors acquired control of the 3,000-acre
Mapos estate in Sancti-Spíritus as well. By far the largest acquisition in land during this
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period occurred in 1893, when a New York firm, headed by Benjamin Perkins and
Osgood Walsh, obtained control of the Constancia estate in Cienfuegos. The 60,000-acre
plantation was the largest single sugar property in the world.

130

The increases in reciprocal trade following the 1891 agreement went far beyond
sugar. In 1893, Cuban imports from the United States reached nearly half of the total U.S.
exports to Central and Latin America ($24 million out of $62 million). Cuban exports to
the U.S. increased 46% from $54 million in 1890 to $79 million in 1893, twelve times
larger than Cuban exports to Spain. Spain accounted for a relatively inconsequential $10
million of Cuban imports and provided the island with only $34 million of its import.131
The Second War for Independence
By the 1890s, the discontent with colonialism had progressed into a dispute as
much between Cubans as between Cubans and Spaniards. The lack of fairness or justice
had a peculiar local quality. The oppression in Cuba was more internal than external,
social inequality was the premise around which armed separatists rallied. Cubans had,
and continued to, advocate for independence, but now they also spoke of war as a
technique for redemption and social change. A new constituency formed around the idea
of Cuba Libre, or free Cuba; the politically displaced, the socially deprived, and the
economically desperate, for whom armed struggle appeared to be the only way to address
grievances against the colonial regime and the local aristocracy. To this constituency,
there were two prime obstacles blocked the way to independence: peninsulares¸ the
aristocracy of the island, and the planters.
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However, there was in fact in fact a third obstacle: the United States. So intensely
did the Cuba Libre challenge the colonial system and so stubbornly did it declare the
primacy of Cuban interests that it placed the separatists onto a collision course with the
U.S. The independentista concept or plan was simple: Cuba was for Cubans, but nearly a
century of U.S. policy had been dedicated to preventing just that. In essence, Cuba Libre,
as it existed in the 1890s, would not be able to proceed without deeply effecting Cuba’s
political relations with Spain, class relations on the island, and the major economic
relationship with the U.S. So intertwined were these three relationships that one could not
be changed without deeply effecting the other two. Throwing off the colonial regime
would result in nothing less than the complete overthrow of the structures that had
supported the peninuslares rule, maintained the privilege and property of the creole elites,
and allowed U.S. interests to participating in the local economy.
Political discontent was not the only aspect of colonial disaffection. In 1894, the
U.S. passed Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act, which rescinded U.S. tariff concessions on
Cuban exports and imposed a new 40 percent ad valorem duty on all sugar entering the
U.S. This effectively dismantled the foundation of the earlier Foster-Cánovas reciprocal
trade agreement between Washington and Madrid. The Spanish government responded
quickly by canceling duty concessions on U.S. imports. An all-out trade war seemed to
be brewing between the two nations.
The sudden disentanglement of Cuba from its most prosperous trading market in
the U.S. had severe consequences. Cuba lost its preferential access to the only market in
the region with the capacity and demand to absorb the growing sugar production and
thereby isolate it from the uncertainties of the world markets. Spanish retaliatory tariffs
48

had then raised the possibility that the U.S. would respond by banning Cuban sugar
altogether.
The effect on the Cuban economy was immediate and profound, profits and
production plummeted. Sugar exports that had grown from $64 million in 1893, steadily
plummeted to $45 million in 1895, and then to $13 million a year later. Two years after
the record one million ton sugar harvest in 1894, the sugar harvest was 225,000 tons. 132
Sugar producers not only faced a decline in profits and production, but also faced with
the prospect of losing preferential access to the machines, equipment, and spare parts that
had revolutionized the sugar industry during the midcentury. In Santiago de Cuba, new
duties on material from the U.S. after 1894 drastically raised prices on all imports (table
1). Further, the loss of access to preferential U.S. markets also coincided with a drop in
global sugar prices. As a result, the price of sugar fell to below two cents a pound for the
first time in Cuban sugar production history.
Table 1. Select Trade Prices, 1891-1894 133
1891Material

1893

1894

Iron Bridge Material

Free

$48.00 per ton

Iron or Steel Rails

Free

$10.00 per ton

Iron or Steel Tools

Free

$25.00 per ton

Machinery

Free

$15.00-$60.00 per ton
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The impact of the 1894 crisis reached far beyond the sugar system, no facet of
Cuban society was insulated from it. Many of the merchants, traders, and retailers who
had replaced their traditional commercial ties with Spanish suppliers with U.S. suppliers
were now faced with ruin. Unemployment skyrocketed, the price of commodity goods
increased, and prices soared. Particularly alarming was the exponential increase in
foodstuffs; the government duties were passed directly onto consumers, causing prices
skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. The Spanish government’s restoration of colonial
customs duties meant that the island would pay exponentially higher prices for staple
food imports (table 2). As costs for basic goods increased, discretionary spending was
sharply curtailed, decreasing the availability of higher-priced goods. This led to a drop in
U.S. shipping; by October 1894, half of the U.S. steamers that had been traveling to
Santiago de Cuba no longer serviced the port. 134

Select Foodstuff Prices per 100 kilos, 1893-1895 135
Foodstuff

1891-1893

1894

Percent Change

Wheat

$0.30 $3.95

1217%

Flour

$1.00 $4.75

375%

Corn

$0.25 $3.95

1480%

Meal

$0.25 $4.75

1800%
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The islander’s sense of economic deprivation served to highlight the growing
recognition of their own political powerlessness. As Cuban producers and consumer’s
dependence on U.S. markets grew, they became more and more affected by the
unexpected fluctuation in this market. The economic safety of Cuba became more and
more dependent on forces over which nobody on the island had significant control.
Throughout the economic turmoil of the 1890s, Cubans found themselves reduced to
passive onlookers in economic drama involving the total meltdown of the Cuban
economy, powerless to control the forces that governed their lives.
There was a mounting sense of acquaintance with such powerlessness, and the
Cubans began to grow weary of it. La Lucha of Havana lamented that, “Here we are tired
of protesting against exorbitant levies used to keep Yankee goods out of Cuba. In vain,
too, have been our efforts against the imposition of prohibitive duties on American
goods. We have not been heard in Madrid; because we are miserable and long suffering
colonists, our clamors are undeserving of the attention of those who govern and
misgovern.” 136
Questions of Cuba's status and the nature and necessity of its relationship with
Spain came to the forefront of political debate and discussion on the island. A looming
sense of uncertainty and uneasiness permeated throughout the island. In late 1894, the
U.S. Consul in Santiago de Cuba reported that, “the residents and commercial interests
here are protesting loud and strong against being thus summarily cut off from their
natural commercial allies, and this action on the part of the home government adds
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greatly to the feeling of unrest that pervades all classes. 137 The prosperity that the Cubans
had seen for nearly half a century was precipitated by the expansion of trade, which had
required the reduction of Spanish control. The success from the close economic ties to the
United States made the prospect of returning to a regimen of strict Spanish exclusivity as
inadmissible as it was inconceivable.
The separatist war, the "Grito de Baire," began in late February 1895, in the same
manner that the revolts prior to it had: localized skirmishes broke out in the remote
eastern mountains of Cuba, an area that appeared to be too distant to cause planters and
politicians in eastern Cuba to worry. Nevertheless, by the summer the once local revolt
had grew to a matter of national importance. The insurgent armies had marched out of the
eastern mountains and down into the rich cattle-grazing estates of Camagüey in the
summer, through the fertile sugar plantations of Matanzas and Havana in the Autumn,
and deep into the lucrative tobacco fields of Pinar del Río by the onset of winter. In less
than a year, the revolt had reached areas of Cuba that had never before been touched by
the armed stirrings of nationality. 138
The creole elite in Cuba held no delusions of safety after 1896. For decades the
local property owners had clung to the Spanish colonial regime protection, but by the
final years of the nineteenth century, Spain was practically defaulting on its raison d'être
for still being in Cuba. The struggling colonial bourgeoisie contemplated their imminent
destruction with deepening depression. Certain that the Spanish sovereignty over Cuba
was doomed to fail, they were now ready to sacrifice the colonial relationship for any
137
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source of protection and patronage. The bourgeoisie was now faced with what they had
feared the most throughout the nineteenth century: a successful populist uprising and they
needed help quickly.
U.S. intervention, many Cubans concluded, was the only hope of ending the
insurrection and restoring the beleaguered social order. In June 1896, close to a hundred
prominent planters, lawyers, merchants, and manufactures petitioned President Grover
Cleveland to intervene in the conflict. "We cannot," the petitioners pleaded, "express our
opinion openly and formally, for he who should dare, whilst living in Cuba, to protest
against Spain, would, undoubtedly, be made a victim, both in his person and his property,
to the most ferocious persecution at the hands of the government." The petitioners then
explained that Spain had nothing further to offer Cuba, save economic destruction and
ruin. The property owners did not find solace in the idea of independence either; they
believed that if the Spanish rule threatened havoc, independence would lead to complete
chaos.
With confidence in Spain nonexistent, and uncertain of their future under Cuban
rule, property owners asked Washington to intercede in the conflict: "We would ask that
the party responsible to us should be the United States. In them we have confidence, and
in them only." 139 “The worst thing that could happen to Cuba,” bemoaned one planter,
“would be independence,” adding that Cubans, “cannot bring a firm and stable
government to the island.” 140 In early 1879, a U.S. correspondent in Havana noted that
planters, merchants, and businesspersons had concluded that Cuba was lost to Spain and
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hoped for U.S. intervention, and eventual annexation. 141 Later in the year, William H.
Calhoun, a special agent deployed to Cuba at the behest of the State department, reported
on the local conditions, “Cuban planters and Spanish property holders are now satisfied
that the island must soon slip from Spain’s grasp, and would welcome immediate
American intervention.” 142
From the outset of the uprising, President Cleveland’s administration had upheld
the longstanding U.S. policy approaches to Cuba: oppose Cuban independence and
support Spanish sovereignty. The reasoning behind the policy remained the same; Cuban
independence could lead to political instability, social clashes, and economic anarchy.
Further, the large number of people of color participating in the insurrection in positions
of prominence, and in possession of arms added onto the U.S. apprehension. Secretary of
State Richard B. Olney articulated that even the "most devoted friend of Cuba," and the
"most enthusiastic advocate for popular government," could not look at the turmoil in
Cuba "except with the gravest apprehension." Secretary Olney further reasoned that:
There are only too strong reasons to fear that, once Spain were withdrawn from
the island, the sole bond of union between the different factions of the insurgents
would disappear; that a war of races would be precipitated, all the more
sanguinary for the discipline and experience acquired during the insurrection, and
that, even if there were to be a temporary peace, it could only be through the
establishment of a white and black republic, which, even if agreeing at the outset
upon a division of the island between them, would be enemies from the start, and

141
142

New York World, 22 March 1897. 1.
Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 46.

54

would never rest until the one had been completely vanquished or subdued by the
other. 143
The United States once again stood by and supported Spanish efforts to maintain
sovereignty over the islands. In 1895, President Cleveland demanded adherence to the
U.S. neutrality laws and vigorously enforced them. Washington coordinated with Spain
to prevent Cuban filibustering expeditions from forming and departing from the U.S.
Between 1895 and 1896, the U.S. government intercepted more than half of the Cuban
filibustering expeditions in the U.S. and proceeded to prosecute the offenders. Overall,
about seventy expeditions tried to organize in the U.S. throughout the war, but only a
third would reach the island. 144
Despite the outward support for the Spanish, the U.S. had concluded that they
were doomed to failure. Secretary Olney wrote in September of 1895, “While the
insurrectionary forces to be dealt with are more formidable than ever before, the ability of
Spain to cope with them has visibly and greatly decreased. She is straining every nerve to
stamp out the insurrection within the next few months. For whatever obvious reason,
because she is almost at the end of her resources.” Finally concluding: “Spain cannot
possibly succeed.” 145
As Spain tried, and failed to, subdue the insurrection running rampant in Cuba,
the Cleveland administration became convinced that only sweeping reforms in Cuba,
including autonomy, could actually bring the rebellion to end while preserving some
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semblance of Spanish sovereignty. A political solution would be required to preserve
even a modified colonial status quo. The U.S. support of Spanish efforts was rooted in the
belief that Spain would eventually establish its authority over its rebelling colony, if not
through immediate military action, then eventually through political concessions.
Reconciliatory Efforts
The passing of a year would change everything though. In 1897, President
William McKinley was elected leader of the U.S., and his Republican administration
pursued colonial reforms with new vigor. The new Liberal ministry in Madrid under
Praxedes Mateo Sagasta also ceased to oppose reforms. The Cuban insurrection has
devolved into a war of attrition, one that Spain could not possibly hope to win. The
Spanish army was constantly on the defensive, walled off in the major cities, while the
Cuban army roamed the countryside on the offensive. Because of the war, the economies
of both Spain and Cuba were on the brink of collapse.
In the autumn of 1897, due to U.S. pressure and deteriorating conditions, the
Spanish Liberal ministry enacted a series of far reaching reforms. In October, Madrid
appointed moderate general Ramòm Blanco as the governor of the island. Amnesty was
issued to all rebels and political prisoners were released. In December, the Spanish
announced a new constitution, which featured an autonomous, and installed a liberal
creole government on January 1, 1898.
These colonial reforms had the opposite effect, dooming Spanish control over
Cuba. For those who defended Spanish rule over Cuba the liberal reforms were
tantamount to treason. The loyalists denounced the autonomous creole government,
reasoning that it would leave the island open up to further subversion; the radicals in the
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government would overrun the moderates, revolution would outpace reform, and
autonomy would lead to independence. U.S. Consul Fitzhugh Lee reported in 1897 that,
“All classes of the Spanish citizens are violently opposed to real or genuine autonomy
because it would throw the control of the island into the hands of the Cubans and rather
than that, they would prefer annexation to the United States or some form of an American
protectorate.” 146
By giving in to a liberal government, the Spanish had convinced the loyalists,
peninsulares, and creoles that it had lost the will to defend its sovereignty over Cuba.
Many postulated that the granting of autonomy was evidence that Spain was organizing
to abandon the colony. The most astute among the peninsulares and creoles understood
that the new Cuban government lacked the ability to wage war and the authority to make
peace. The establishment of a government consisting of creole moderates dealt the final
blows to conservative resolve in Cuba. Developments during late 1897 and early 1898
weakened the determination of the only forces in Cuba who, besides the insurgents,
retained the loyalty and will to win.
The new Cuban government was vigorously denounced by mass meetings and
rallies held across the island, swelling the number of appeals for U.S. intervention. In
November 1897, the U.S. vice consul in Matanzas conveyed that, “nearly all Spaniards,
businessmen, and property holders in this province wish and pray for annexation to the
United States.” 147 Fitzhugh Lee’s reports from Havana in November 1897 corroborated
this sentiment, “A large majority of the Spanish subjects who have commercial or
business interests and own property here will not accept Autonomy, but prefer annexation
146
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to the United States, rather than an independent republic or genuine autonomy under the
Spanish flag.” 148
Before the end of the year, the sentiment for U.S. intervention had become public
in both countries. In December 1897, a statement was printed in Havana and signed by
business people and property owners that claimed to represent 80 percent of the island’s
wealth denouncing the autonomist regime. 149 At the same time, a meeting of property
owners in Cienfuegos penned a resolution urging President McKinley to establish a
protectorate over Cuba. In February 1989, the most powerful peninsulares created a
formal commission to secure U.S. assistance. “The mother country cannot protect us,”
they insisted, “Blanco will not protect us. If left to the insurgents our property is lost.
Therefore, we want the United States to save us.” 150
The same reforms that were too much for the loyalists proved to be too little for
the separatists. The insurgents denounced the autonomy and rejected accommodating
Spain on anything other than complete independence. General Máximo Gómez vowed,
“It is the firm resolution of the army and people of Cuba who have shed so much blood in
order to conquer their independence, not to falter in their just cause until triumph or death
crowns their efforts.” 151 General Gómez reiterated the Cuban position two weeks later:
“We no longer ask concessions… Even were Spain’s proposals bona fide, nothing could
tempt us to treat with her. We are for liberty, not for Spanish reforms.” 152
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Rather than conciliating Cubans, the Spanish reforms actually made them more
obstinate, and separatist morale soared. Provisional President Bartolomè Masò proudly
proclaimed, “Spain’s offers of autonomy is a sign of her weakening.” 153 General Calixto
Garcìa agreed: “I regard autonomy only as a sign of Spain’s weakening power and an
indication that the end is not far off.” 154
The reforms had failed; Spain had made the ultimate concession as a last resort to
maintain its colonial empire, but its sovereignty over Cuba was ending. The realization
lifted separatist morale to an all-time high, never before had it been clearer that they
would triumph. Preparations for the last desperate battles around Spanish strongholds
began to take place. In the east end of the island, General Calixto Garcìa laid siege to
Santiago de Cuba, and in the west, the insurgents began to surround the larger provincial
inland cities. General Máximo Gómez seemed as confident as ever when he discussed the
preparations for the final assaults against Spanish strongholds; with “cannons and a great
deal of dynamite,” Gómez projected that “we can expel them by fire and steel from the
towns.” 155
The United States also recognized that the failed reforms doomed any hope that
Madrid would be able to salvage any semblance of control over Cuba. Secretary of State
John Sherman lamented ruefully, “Spain will lose Cuba. That seems to be certain. She
cannot continue the struggle.” 156 Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day publicly
agreed, "The Spanish government seems unable to conquer the insurgents." In a private
memorandum, Day went even further:
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Today the strength of the Cubans [is] nearly double... and [they] occupy and
control virtually all the territory outside the heavily garrisoned coast cities and a
few interior towns. There are no active operations by the Spaniards...The eastern
provinces are admittedly "Free Cuba." In view of these statements alone, it is now
evident that Spain's struggle in Cuba has become absolutely hopeless... Spain is
exhausted financially and physically, while the Cubans are stronger. 157
With the receding tide of Spanish sovereignty, Washington was now faced with a
Cuba which bad been an anathema to U.S. policymakers since President Jefferson: a
strong possibility of Cuban independence. The realities of the “no transfer” policy were
now carried to their ugly conclusions. The United States could not permit Spain to
transfer Cuba to another power, and it would not permit Spain to now cede sovereignty of
the island to the Cubans.
U.S. diplomacy took on a new sense of interventionism, increasing the pressure
on Spain. On 27 March, Washington delivered a three-part ultimatum to Madrid; an
armistice must be instated until October 5, a halting of resettlement programs with
permission to distribute U.S. relief supplies, and the utilization of President McKinley as
a mediator to negotiate the end of the rebellion. In return, the U.S. promised that it would
use “friendly offices to insurgents to accept the plan.” 158
After ten days of frantic negotiation and avoidance, Spain capitulated. On April 5,
the Queen Regent proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire in Cuba, effective immediately and
lasting until September. Five days later, Washington received Spain's formal acceptance
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of the provisions of McKinley's 27 March ultimatum. On the same day in Havana,
Governor General Blanco ordered all Spanish forces to cease operations. 159
McKinley had scored a major victory save for one important fact; he had failed to
make good on the U.S. part of the 27 March ultimatum: to use his “friendly offices to get
the insurgents to accept the plan.” The collapse of the U.S. proposal was not due to
Spanish equivocation, but to the U.S. inability to obtain Cuban agreement to the ceasefire. The Cuban insurgent leaders would in no way agree to a cease-fire, they argued that
it would have calamitous consequences on the Cuban war effort, only benefitting Spain.
The insurgent leaders ordered their forces to continue operations; General Calixto Garcìa
encouraged his troops, “They have to be hit hard and at the head, day and night. In order
to suspend hostilities, an agreement is necessary with our Government and this will have
to be based on independence.” General Máximo Gómez declared, “More than ever, the
war must continue in full force.” 160
The Cuban denunciation of the Spanish cease-fire ended all U.S. hopes that the
summer campaign of 1898 could be averted. Spain had only one condition to its
agreement: that the Cubans observe the ceasefire. With the Cuban refusal, Spain had no
choice but to recommence full field operations and march to an inevitable military defeat.
The tables had been turned; no longer were the U.S. or Spain determining the fate of the
island, the Cubans now firmly held the reigns. Once Spain refused to transfer Cuba to the
United States, and the Cubans rejected Spanish sovereignty in any form, the U.S.
politicians were faced with two prospects: independence or intervention.
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American Intervention

Cuban independence was not just a threat to the propriety of colonial rule or the
property relations in the regime; it directly challenged the expectation of colonial
succession. By ending Spanish sovereignty in 1898, the Cubans also endangered the U.S.
claim to sovereignty. The U.S. viewed the transfer of Cuba into its hands as the next
natural act of colonial continuity. The Cuban rebellions success put all of this into
jeopardy. The U.S. was as frustrated with the Spanish inability to maintain control over
the island as it was alarmed at the prospect of a Cuban victory. Neither repression nor
concession were successful, causing Spanish sovereignty to quickly slip beyond recovery.
If Washington did not act decisively, that sovereignty would also be lost to the U.S.
As a result, President William McKinley asked congress in April 1898 to
authorize military intervention in Cuba: to declare war against Spain, and by
consequence, the Cubans as well. President McKinley’s war address provided few
references of concrete foreign policy; it contained no mention of Cuban independence, no
recognition of the Cuban provisional government, no sympathy for Cuba Libre, and did
not even make a mention of territorial expansion. The purpose for U.S. forces in Cuba,
McKinley emphasized, was the “forcible intervention…as a neutral to stop the war. The
forcible intervention of the United States…involves…hostile constraint upon both the
parties to the contest.” 161 The U.S. planned to neutralize both the Spaniards and the
Cubans, thereby establishing its own superiority over the island. McKinley administration
opponents in Congress made efforts to officially recognize the provisional Cuban
republic, and by mid-April, McKinley was forced to yield to the compromise. Article IV
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of the congressional resolution, the Teller Amendment, stated that the United States,
“hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island except for pacification thereof, and asserts its determination,
when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its
people.” 162
Independence in Name Only
U.S. intervention in 1898 would radically alter the situation in Cuba: the Cuban
war for independence was now a U.S. war of conquest. The Cuban revolt had been
transformed into the “Spanish-American War,” nomenclature that was meant to ignore
Cuban participation in the war and revealed the next series of changes. The U.S. forces
would not land on the island as allies of the Cuban people or arbiters of their
independence; they were going to war, as they always said they would, to prevent the
transfer of Cuban sovereignty to a third party.
The exclusion of the Cuban people began almost as soon as the U.S. troops
arrived. The U.S. commanders retrograded insurgent forces behind U.S. troops in order to
serve in a support role, Cuban commander’s advice and opinions were ignored, and the
negotiations for the surrender of Santiago de Cuba in July were conducted without any
Cuban representation, with Cubans being prohibited to enter the city as part of the
surrender agreement. General Calixto Garcìa was floored by the audacity of the
Americans and asked U.S. Army Major General William R. Shafter to clarify the terms
of the agreement. General Shafter informed General Garcìa that Santiago de Cuba was
now considered part of the territory conquered by the United States and “part of the
162
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Union.” 163 This was in spite of all the insurgent preparations and campaigns that had led
up to the surrender. General Shafter publicly announced that the reason that Cubans were
denied access was to the city was based on the fear that the insurgents would be unable to
restrain themselves from attacking Spanish soldiers, abusing women, and plundering the
city. 164
Resentment and anger swept through the Cuban camps, General Garcìa
condemned the notion that Santiago de Cuba was “part of the union:” “I will never accept
that our country be considered conquered territory.” 165 General Garcìa was incensed that
his Cuban soldiers had been labeled as unable to control themselves from raping and
killing, stating to General Shafter: “Allow me to protest against even a shadow of such an
idea, we are not savages who ignore the principles of civilized warfare. We respect too
much our cause to stain it with barbarity and cowardice.” 166
These issues revealed the fundamentally different situations that the U.S. and
Cubans found themselves in 1898. By the end of the war the disconnect was widespread;
insurgent commanders became non-cooperative and hostile, withdrawing from joint
operations and breaking off contact with U.S. forces. General Garcìa turned in his
resignation declaring that he could “no longer [be] disposed to continue obeying the
orders and cooperating with the plans of the American Army.” He warned his fellow
Cubans to avoid ceding any power to the “army of intervention.” 167
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The surrender negotiations of Santiago de Cuba in July were not the only
negotiations conducted without Cuban participation. Both the peace protocol in August
and the peace treaty conclusion in the autumn in Paris were held purely without Cuban
influence. The Treaty of Paris formally passed sovereignty over to the U.S., beginning a
three-year military occupation of the island. During these three years, an economic
revival and reconstruction took place; as production and employment increased, the
dilapidated Cuban economy began to emerge from its war paralysis. The U.S. brought
sanitary programs to improve the living conditions, public-works programs to build
highways, and transportation initiatives to stimulate Cuban revival. 168
The U.S. occupation of the island also determined the manner of Cuba's future
relations with the U.S. In January 1901, Secretary of State Elihu Root discussed four
provisions that he deemed essential to U.S. interests: first, "in transferring the control of
Cuba to the Government established under the new constitution the United States
reserved and retains the right to intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence
and the maintenance of a stable Government adequately protecting life, property and
individual liberty.” Second, “No government organized under the constitution shall be
deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or engagement with any foreign power
which may tend to impair or interfere with the independence of Cuba.” Secretary Root
also asserted that to perform “such duties as may devolve upon her under the foregoing
provisions and for her own defense” the U.S. “may acquire and hold the title to land, and
maintain naval stations at certified points.” Finally, Secretary Root concluded that, “all
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the acts of the Military Government, and all rights acquired thereunder, shall be valid and
maintained and protected.” 169
These were the crucial features of the Platt Amendment, which was enacted into
law the by U.S. Congress in February 1901. Though not a perfect substitution for
annexation, it devolved Cuban sovereignty into an extension of the U.S. national system.
Cuba was restricted from conducting foreign relations, specifically treaty authority, debt
restrictions, and cession territory in order to prevent Cuba from becoming internationally
entangled. 170
News of the Platt Amendment caused widespread criticism and protests in Cuba.
Anti-U.S. demonstrations took place across the island, with former insurgent military
leaders menacingly alluding to the necessity of returning to the field of battle to defend
their independista ideals. Veterans associations, city councils, and civic and community
organizations cabled their outrage to U.S. authorities in Washington and Havana. The
situation caused so much apprehension in the U.S. leadership that the Key West Naval
Squadron was prompted to pay a courtesy call to the island. 171
In April 1901, Cuban apprehensions were temporarily appeased when a Cuban
commission visited Washington and received personal assurances from President
McKinley that the Platt Amendment would never be utilized to restrict in any way Cuban
sovereignty. Though still bitterly divided the commission decided to accept the Platt
Amendment. The Platt Amendment met all the original U.S. demands. It restored the
longstanding U.S. commercial and security interests in the area with the Teller
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Amendment. The amendment served as a substitute for direct formal annexation, while
transferring Cuban sovereignty into the U.S. national system, thereby preventing Cuban
from being embroiled in international entanglements.
Cuba had finally secured its independence, in a manner of speaking, or at least the
appearance of independence. In actuality, Cuba obtained self-government without selfdetermination, and independence without sovereignty. This was not what the Cuban
rebels had set out to achieve when they launched a war in 1895, U.S. rule had merely
been substituted for Spain’s. The vast destruction of property during the rebellion and the
U.S. occupation had opened a new and decisive phase in the U.S. economic permeation
of Cuba. The total level of urban indebtedness was estimated at $100 million, more than
three-quarters of Cuba's declared property value of $139 million. The debt was not
limited to the urban sphere; rural real estate was in $107 million in debt with a total
property value of roughly $185 million. 172
U.S. investors and entrepreneurs flocked to the island after the war, searching for
any nonoperational plantations, destroyed farmland, and abandoned agricultural estates to
purchase and refurbish for profit. Opportunities abounded, one U.S. investor exclaimed,
“Nowhere else in the world are there such chances for success for the man of moderate
means, as well as for the capitalist, as Cuba offers today…I advise the capitalist to invest
in Cuba, and seriously suggest to the young and ambitious man to go to Cuba and cast his
fortune with those of the island.” Commercial and Financial World described Cuba as
“simply a poor man’s paradise and a rich man’s mecca.” 173 In 1898, two former U.S.
consular agents reported that, “Land, at this writing, can be bought in unlimited quantities
172
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at from one-half to one-twentieth of its value before the insurrection. For the ordinarily
prudent man with some capital, who is willing to work, the island has opportunities for
success and wealth through safe and profitable investments, the equal of which can be
found in no other state.” 174
Speculators looked upon Cuba in wonder of the possibilities: Cuba was the new
frontier. The island was described as a “virgin land,” and a “new California.” 175 Isaac
Ford remarked that, “Americans…have on their southern seaboard another California.” 176
General Leonard Wood, military governor of Cuba, agreed, describing the island as "a
brand new economy." 177 The cheap land interested miners, farmers, and ranchers, the
same kind of people that were enticed by the first frontier. The U.S. gradually accepted
control as a substitute for possession, arranged it thus in the 1901 Cuban constitution, and
later a formal treaty. Excited with the prospect of a new frontier, thousands of U.S.
opportunists traveled to the tropics. Though consisting of a wide variety of citizens, most
were farmers and colonists, enticed by the availability of land. They would end up
cultivating citrus fruit plantations, pineapple farms, and vegetables to export back to the
U.S. markets. The American influence was undeniable, as immigrants swelled, towns
with peculiar names began sprouting up: McKinley, Ocean Beach, Riverside, Garden
City, Palm City, Omaja, and Bartle. 178
Powerful capitalists and corporations also flocked to the island, displacing Cubans
and acquiring tens of thousands of acres of Cuban plantations and farmlands that had
174

Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 54.
176
Isaac Nelson Ford, Tropical America. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1893. 279.
177
Edwin Marshall, "A Talk with General Wood." In The Outlook. Vol. 68. New York: Outlook Company,
1901. 670.
178
Leonard, United States-Latin America Relations. 54.
175

68

fallen into disrepair or default. Control by U.S. companies over the sugar production on
the island greatly expanded during the military occupation. In 1899, less than a year after
the occupation began, R. B. Hawley formed the Cuban-American Sugar Company and
acquired the 7,000-acre Tinguaro estate in Matanzas, the Mercidatas mill in Pinar del
Río, and organized the Chaparra sugar mill on 70,000 acres of land acquired in Puerto
Padre. A year later, a group of U.S. investors purchased the 80,000-acre Francisco estate
in the Southern Camagüey province. The Nipe Bay Company, a subsidiary of the United
Fruit Company, acquired 40,000 acres of land in Puerto Padre in 1901. The United Fruit
Company would then purchase 200,000-acres near Banes. Ten years after the struggle for
independence, the Cubans were not as free as they thought; U.S. corporations controlled
almost the entire Oriente north coast, from Baracoa to Manatí. 179 Nearly 500,000 acres
were distributed among roughly 2,000 U.S. mining operations during the occupation as
well. 180
During the occupation, U.S. investors also advanced into Cuba’s transportation
systems. The Cuba Company constructed the Cuban railway across the islands,
purchasing 50,000 acres of land, and the right of way for 350 miles of track in the
process. The Santiago Railroad Company, the Cuba Railway, the Cuban Easter Railway,
and the Guantánamo Railroad were all prominent rail lines owned by U.S. investors. The
U.S. also dominated electric transportation; the Havana Electric Railway Company, a
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New Jersey corporation, gained control of the capital’s electric transportation systems,
with the Havana Central linking the capital to Marianao and Mariel. 181
U.S. corporations also moved to take over the utilities on the Island. The Spanish
American Light and Power Company of New York was responsible for providing gas to
the principal Cuban cities. Havana Central and Havana Electric, both U.S. based
corporations, controlled electricity. Contractors from the U.S. set up shop in Havana to
compete for lucrative government contracts. The Havana Subway Company was granted
monopoly rights to install underground cables and electrical wires. U.S. capital controlled
the telephone industry and the water industry as well. 182
The government contractors, employing U.S. laborers, constructed the public
buildings, roads, and bridges of the early republic. Engineering companies constructed
the ports in major coastal cities such as Havana. The T.L. Huston Contracting Company
acquired the contract to dredge the major ports and construct wharves in Havana and
Cuba. The Huston Company also won the contract to build the highway connecting
Havana to the Pinar del Río. A subsidiary of the contracting Company was granted the
contract to construct the new Havana sewer systems. The Snare and Triest Company of
New York built steel bridges, drawbridges, and fixed bridges for railroads, lighthouse
along the coast, and a power plant providing electricity to Havana. The Tropical
Engineering and Construction Company won the government contract to construct the
Havana water supply system and multiple power plants in Matanzas. 183
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During the occupation, roughly three-quarters of the cattle ranches with an
estimated value of $30 million fell into U.S. investor’s hands. Sisal farms were bought
out by International Harvester, banana farms by United Fruit, Standard Fruit, and
DeGeorgio Fruit. The Harris Brothers Company supplied the new government with
stationery, officer supplies, and paper. The Havana Advertising Company held all the
most lucrative advertising contracts and billboards. 184 Though many of the companies
operated under Cuban affiliated names, there was no doubt where the capital and
direction flowed from.
In 1903, Cuba and the U.S. negotiated three treaties that affirmed over fifty years
of relations and ushered in a new era of relations. The Permanent Treaty of 1903 formally
and permanently bound the Platt Amendment. The Amendment, which was originally
just an appendix to the Cuban Constitution of 1901, was made legally binding under
international law. The treaty assured that the U.S. would have an established presence in
Cuban internal affairs, serving as the basis of relations between the two countries until
1934.
The U.S. and Cuba also signed a Reciprocity Treaty. This treaty invigorated
economic ties by creating a tariff schedule that granted Cuban agricultural exports a 20
percent reduction in duties. In return, Cuba granted the U.S. a 20 percent concession on
most imports, with increases to 24, 30, and 40 percent in some specific categories. Most
of the imports in the 20 percent category were previously heavily consumed on the
island, and were not expected to affect trade. The higher percentage concessions were on
goods that had European competition, pricing the European goods out of the market.
184
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The economic treaty accelerated the integration of the Cuban economy into the
U.S.’s. With the elimination of the Spanish colonial trade restrictions, the Cuban
economy was immediately opened up to unfettered U.S. investment. This discouraged
Cuban economic diversification, and increased reliance on foreign goods, specifically
foodstuffs. Preferential access to U.S. markets furthered Cuban dependency on sugar
exports and increased the U.S. control over the industry. By 1902, U.S. entrepreneurs
owned 55 of the 223 sugar mills, amounting to 40 percent of the islands sugar production.
By the mid-1920s, U.S. corporations owned 41 of the 184 mills, and 63 percent of the
total production. 185
Finally, the two countries signed a treaty that established a U.S. naval base at
Guantánamo Bay. This treaty was part of the clause in the Platt Amendment where Cuba
would lease the U.S. land in Bahía Honda and Guantánamo Bay. The U.S. would
eventually exchange the leasing rights to Bahía Honda for enlarged territory in
Guantánamo.
The three treaties between the U.S. and Cuba in 1903 merged and strengthened
the political, economic, and strategic position of the U.S. in Cuba and the Caribbean
region. Prudent negotiations and military involvement had allowed the U.S., much like it
had in Chile, to interject itself into Latin American politics and emerge stronger than
before. Washington had effectively cut off points of entry and exit into the Caribbean. By
1903, the Caribbean had become the American Mediterranean, with the U.S. holding the
proverbial straits of Gibraltar in Florida and Cuba.
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The Roosevelt Corollary
By 1904, with the expulsion of the Spanish from Cuba, the annexation of Puerto
Rico, the binding of Cuba with the 1903 treaties, and the creation of a protectorate in
Panama, the United States had clearly established it's hegemony in the Central America
and the Caribbean. The next logical step was for the U.S. to assume the task of the
preserving the stability in the region, as it had now become vital to American security.
The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe doctrine would provide the vindication for the
U.S. assuming the role as the international police officer. Though the Corollary was
hardly in line with the principals of 1823, it was founded with important precursors in
mind. President Polk's message on April 29, 1848, questioned the Yucatan's right to
transfer its sovereignty to a European power, the McLane-Ocampo agreements in 1859
permitted the U.S. to protect its citizens and their property in Mexico, and most recently
the U.S. government takeover of Cuba.
However, in 1904, there was admittedly less precedent for intervention to end
financial mayhem. Only once in the 19th century had the U.S. considered such action; on
February 7, 1880, a delinquent Venezuela, fearing retaliatory action from France,
proposed to deliver monthly revenues to Washington for distribution to foreign
creditors. 186 On July 23, 1881, Secretary Blaine warned the French that under certain
conditions, the U.S. would be obliged to administer Venezuela’s customs house, but
nothing ever came of the threat.
It was the Venezuelan imbroglio during 1902-1903 that most shaped the
Roosevelt Corollary. The reaction from within the U.S. to the Anglo-German blockade
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convinced President Roosevelt that European coercion of American republic’s debt
should be prevented, but his sense of justice told him that the legitimate claims to the
debt would have to be addressed. On February 22, 1904, a court in Hague decided that
force was a legitimate method to guarantee repayment of debts. This persuaded President
Roosevelt that the temptation to declare war and seize assets to repay debt was too great
and must be done away with. 187
Thus, on December 6, 1904, after a triumph in the polls President Roosevelt
issued a message stating that the U.S. did not seek additional lands in the Americas.
However, “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of
the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United
States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in
flagrant cases of wrongdoing and impotence, to the exercise of international police
power." 188 The U.S. would interject itself into disputes between European countries and
Latin American Countries, enforcing the legitimate claims, rather than the Europeans
pressing their claims directly.
The Roosevelt Corollary, just like the Monroe Doctrine, was a profound statement
by the executive branch. When President Roosevelt presented the Corollary in 1904, the
legislature did not endorse it, just as it had not endorsed the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.
President Roosevelt did not meet opposition until he endeavored to translate the theory
into reality. On January 20, 1905, Minister Thomas C. Dawson signed a protocol in Santa
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Domino providing a U.S. guarantee that the territorial integrity of the Dominican
Republic would remain intact, and that the U.S. would control over Dominican customs
houses, including payment of all Dominican debts from the revenues collected. 189 When
the U.S. Senate got wind of this agreement, it erupted in righteous indignation and
injured pride. The Panama affair had already angered the Senate, and many members
considered the agreement an abridgment of senatorial prerogatives.
In order to assuage fears of presidential powers run amok, Minister Dawson was
ordered to change the terms of the agreement. On February 7, 1905, the agreements
guarantee of territorial integrity was altered to promise to respect it, with references to
the Monroe Doctrine being inserted into the preamble of the agreement. The renovated
agreement reached the Senate on February 15, but no vote was taken before the Senate
adjourned for summer recess. President Roosevelt called the Senate back into session, but
was unable to overcome opposition and secure the necessary two-thirds majority. 190
President Roosevelt would not give up on his corollary however. Convinced that
he had correctly diagnosed the problems with the Dominican body politic, he was
determined to solve the problem in a different way. If an executive agreement garnered
too great an outcry and a treaty could not be passed, then he would initiate a customs
control via the enforcement of a modus vivendi. President Roosevelt was successful, and
on April 1, 1905, a temporary arrangement was established that included the major points
of the failed treaty.
By April 1905, the American hegemony in the Caribbean was an undeniable fact;
Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone had been annexed, Guantánamo Bay was a permanent
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American naval base, the authority to intervene in both Cuba and Panama was secured,
and the administration of the Dominican customs houses was beginning. The U.S.
acquired the jurisdiction to build, operate, and defend a canal that would soon connect the
Pacific and Atlantic, increasing American power and security on the seas. The Monroe
Doctrine had been greatly expanded and flaunted. The Europeans had been denied a
casus belli on American republics via debts and the English were transferring the bulk of
their navy from the Caribbean to the North Sea to counteract the German buildup. 191 The
United States military and economic supremacy in the Americas was undisputed.
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The Good Neighbor Policy
In the thirty years after the Roosevelt Corollary, the U.S. had deeply involved
itself in the economic and political life of the Latin American nations. In the 1920s, the
U.S. occupied the Dominican Republic and Haiti militarily, with Haiti-American officials
regulating and directing the governments vital activities. American marines kept a
minority government in power in Nicaragua, and in Cuba, a personal representative of the
president was directing efforts to ease electoral disputes and manage an economic
crisis. 192 The goal of the U.S. military intervention was clear: protection the commercial
interests of American businesses above all else. By the 1930s, the Latin Americans grew
wary of constant threat of U.S. intervention and hostilities began to fester.
Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized this resentment as he ascended to the
Presidency in 1933. In his March inaugural address FDR announced that: "In the field of
World policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor, the
neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of
others, the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his
agreements in and with a World of neighbors." 193 Roosevelt sought to repair the image of
the U.S. by reigning in the blatant protectionism of U.S. foreign investment, and restore
U.S.-Latin relations in order to focus on dealing with the Great Depression.
Roosevelt’s strategy centered around three main ideas: abandoning the constant
military and economic intervention, reverting to just and objective foreign policy,
ushering in a new era of Pan Americanism. However, the rhetoric would prove to be
192
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stronger than reality, and created an illusion of hemispheric unity more than anything
else. For the U.S. psyche, the good neighbor policy served as a way to confess the sins of
the pass, have them wiped away, and pretend that the growing power and history of U.S.
intervention would be overlooked in Latin America.
The U.S., in actuality, had been modifying its Latin American policy and strategy
prior to the election of FDR. The Herbert Hoover administration had withdrawn U.S.
troops from Nicaragua in January 1933, and scheduled the withdrawal of forces from
Haiti in 1934. Nonetheless, FDR was the main proponent and most outspoken supporter
of the policy. FDR accelerated the timeline for military withdraw and negotiated a treaty
with Cuba that repealed the Platt Amendment. However, the U.S. would still maintain its
base in Guantánamo Bay.
To give his inaugural address some substance FDR pledge nonintervention at the
inter-American conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 1933. In eyes of Latin
Americans, the test of neighborliness would be the U.S. refraining from intervention, but
it was considered quite a victory to get the U.S. signature on the clause that read: "No
state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another." 194 Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, however, was not so eager to give up this power, and signed a proviso
stating that the U.S. would continue to reserve the right to intervene according to the
principles of international law. Finally, in 1936, at the Buenos Aires conference, the U.S.
signed on without reservation a promise to refrain from intervening "directly or indirectly

194

Cordell Hull, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Seventh International
Conference of American States, Montevideo, Uruguay, December 3-26, 1933. Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1934.

78

and for whatever reason, in the internal and external affairs of any other parties." 195
Although this did not create a united Western Hemisphere, the U.S. cooperation at least
created a mood of hemispheric cooperation that the U.S. would ride into WWII. 196
There was more to the Good Neighbor Policy than the U.S. altered the way it
handled border disputes and peacekeeping procedures, its major impact was to propagate
the myth of a hemisphere of equals, united with a common view of the world. Although
the policy was a welcomed change, it would not erase the decades of military
intervention and economic exploitation. The Good Neighbor Policy helped build the
Western Hemisphere Idea, but the rhetoric alone would not sustain it.
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Colombian Counter-Insurgency
The most recent significant shift in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America occurred
after terrorists attacked the World Trade Center in 2001. This pivot is best explained
through a careful examination of U.S. involvement in Colombia in the post 9/11 period.
However, to understand the significance of this pivot it is important to be familiar with
the 20th century Colombian history and its relations with the U.S.
La Violencia: Setting the Stage for U.S. Intervention

Since the midpoint of the nineteenth century, the Conservative and Liberal parties
had dominated Colombian politics. Historically, the Conservative Party had represented
the large landholding oligarchy and the Catholic Church, while the Liberal Party had
aligned with the commercial sector and viewed the church as a “backwards social
institution that prevented economic modernization.” 197 Though their specific policy
agendas had aligned for a number a years, the rise of Jorge Gaitán in the Liberal party
during the 1940s reoriented the party with its left wing base. Gaitán brought an
egalitarian agenda to the table, advocating for progressive reform to the labor laws and
land laws. 198 Gaitán’s popularity was established through his appeals to the poor and
dispossessed in Colombia. Gaitán tried to make “capitalism socially responsible, not
abolish it.” 199
Gaitán took the reins of the Liberal Party in 1947, and was a heavy favorite to win
the 1950 presidential elections. However, Gaitán’s populist popularity, criticism of
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unequal distribution of goods and services, made Colombia’s ruling class, largely aligned
with the Conservative Party, increasingly worried and aggressive. In 1984 in Colombia’s
capital, Bogotá, Gaitán was assassinated. His death ended the populist challenge of the
oligarchic authority that griped Colombia, and dashed the hopes of the poor majority who
he had championed. His death “ruptured the breakwaters holding back years of
discontent,” and was followed by riots and an uprising in Bogatá that would destroy
traditional symbols of oligarchic power and privilege. 200 The Colombian military quickly
put down the uprising, but the spark had lit a great fire in the hearts of the Colombian
people, and a large-scale civil war know as la violencia erupted.
The U.S. interpreted the instability caused by the assassination and the subsequent
civil war as dangerously threatening U.S. interests. The U.S. sought to stabilize the
Colombian political system, which, because of two Colombian government collapses in
1948-1949, was on the verge of complete disintegration. 201 The proximity of Colombia to
the Panama Canal marked the Colombian crisis as a “vital concern to the United States,”
according to the U.S. State Department. 202 The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Colonel
Edward Lansdale, argued for aggressive engagement on the part of the U.S. to protect its
access to the canal: “During the expected two years remaining in the Presidency of
Lleras Camarago, there is a real opportunity for the U.S. to undertake assistance to
Colombia to correct the situation of political insurrection which reportedly has caused a
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quarter-million deaths and displaced over a million and a half people since 1948 in this
area neighboring a place so vital to our own national security as the Canal Zone.” 203
The U.S. also maintained significant economic interests in Colombia. In 1959,
Colombia was among the largest markets in South America for U.S. direct foreign
investment (FDI). Of the $339 million of U.S. FDI in Colombia, $225 million was in oil,
followed by manufacturing, public utilities, and general trade. 204 This enhanced the
economic importance of Colombia to the U.S., as access to oil is not merely
manufactured good that can be easily replaced.
The civil war lasted nearly a decade and pitted Conservative and Liberal peasants
against one another, with the death toll of the war estimated to be upwards of 200,000.
Peace was secured in 1958, through the formation of a National Front rotational
government, under which the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to trade off the
presidency every four years. 205
The majority of the armed groups, referred to pejoratively as bandoleros,
surrendered to the Government and were thereby granted amnesty. One of the key
leaders, Manuel Marulanda, began supporting the Communist Party after feeling
alienated by both the Conservative and Liberal parties. Marulanda would later go on to
form the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC), the military
wing of the Colombian Communist Party. The FARC, bolstered by government
sponsored dispossession peasant lands, would become the most armed and dangerous
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guerilla movement in South American history, representing the spread of communist
sentiments into Latin America.
U.S. Counter-Insurgency Policy

During the Cold War, the U.S. intervened in more states in Latin American than
any other continent, utilizing counter-insurgency (CI) as the primary tactic of coercion. 206
U.S. strategists used CI, in accordance with President Eisenhower’s Domino theory, to
internally police U.S.-backed dictatorships and silence left wing insurgencies to prevent
Soviet expansionism. 207 CI was formally recognized as a tool of U.S. statecraft when
President Kennedy signed the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act into law, sending U.S. aid to
developing states in order to increase bilateral military connections and encourage
capitalist economic development.
Walt Rostow, one of President Kennedy’s National Security Advisors, is
responsible for developing the modernization theory as the theoretical element of U.S.sponsored CI. The modernization theory posited that the developmental process of Third
World societies occurred in stages that would eventually result in industrial capitalism.
This evolution was most vulnerable to communist revolution as the economy began to
“take off” through modernization. Rostow posited that internal security arrangements
provided by the U.S. were a necessity in preventing any such revolutions during the take
off period. 208 David Bell, the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(AID), concurred, arguing that a “general theory of economic development,” required a
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“minimum degree of personal security,” with the Cuban revolution bring to light the fact
that “we must often make special adaptations to achieve this, [as] guerrilla warfare and
terrorism [are] obstacles to the peaceful concentration on the problem of economic
growth.” 209
Kennedy’s Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 devoted the U.S. to improving “the
ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary,
defeat [Communist] aggression.” The U.S. sought to achieve this via “arrangements for
individual and collective security,” and by assisting “friendly countries to maintain
internal security…essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political
progress.” 210 The U.S. CI doctrine was founded to fight a war on communist expansion
on ideological, political, and military fronts. The internal security role of the recipient
nation’s military was to police their populations, thereby preventing indigenous
communist rebels from challenging the status quo.
As the past century and a half had been a time of constant turmoil and revolution,
the internally focused Latin-American states committed fully to the U.S. CI strategy and
formed the core of U.S. strategy in Latin America throughout the Cold War. U.S. support
included security assistance, the legitimization of repressive regimes, and the training of
Latin American military personnel at U.S. training academies. The U.S. Army established
the School of the Americas (SOA), which ended up training over 40,000 members of
various Latin American militaries by the end of the Cold War (the school has since been
renamed the Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), and
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continues to train Latin American military members to this day). 211 In 1947, Secretary of
War Robert P. Patterson explained the reasoning behind setting up these academies and
what benefits would flow from them:
[T]he provision of United States Equipment is the keystone since United States
methods of training and organization must inevitably follow its adoption along
with far-reaching concomitant benefits of permanent United States military
missions and the continued flow of Latin American officers through our service
schools. Thus will our ideals and way of life be nurtured in Latin America, to the
eventual exclusion of totalitarian and other foreign ideologies? 212
The U.S. policy planning process recognized strong, authoritarian states as the
best supporter of U.S. interests in Latin America. These authoritarian states often became
despotic, carrying out massive violations of human rights, putting the U.S. at odds with
its publicly declared objective of preventing human rights abuses. The U.S. was not just
guilty of supporting the states that committed these violations by association, practices
had been developed and passed on from U.S. CI doctrine. The U.S.-sponsored CI
doctrine advocated for not only the confronting of armed insurgencies, but also the
policing and disciplining of unarmed civilians. Though the Colombian government was
repressive prior to the U.S. CI aid, the intervention further strengthened and legitimized
the strategy of state terrorism in the name of anti-communism.
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CI Strategy in Practice

U.S. Special Forces took the leading role in training indigenous military and
paramilitary forces in CI tactics. “The Special Action Force [U.S. Special Forces]…
provides advisory personnel and mobile training teams to advise, train and provide
operational assistance for paramilitary forces.” 213 A 1962 special warfare field manual
described the training program for the U.S.’s allied forces; training encompassed,
“guerrilla warfare, propaganda, subversion, intelligence and counter-intelligence, terrorist
activities, civic action, and conventional combat operations.” 214 Counter-Insurgency
Operations, a Special Forces manual that was used to teach foreign militaries on how to
fight asymmetrical warfare against insurgents, stressed the “maintenance of the initiative
by prompt offensive actions, economy of force and employment of suitably organized
and trained troops and police in all-weather field operations utilizing guerrilla/terrorist
tactics.” The manual broke down CI warfare into eight distinct categories; “a) Meeting
engagements; b) Attacks; c) Defense; d) Ambushes… ; e) Raids; f ) Pursuit actions; g)
Interception actions; h) Terror Operations.” 215
Psychological warfare against the recipient’s population was not just tolerated, the
U.S. Army had a manual for it, stating that psychological operations were a central
component in the CI arsenal. The Psychological Operations manual specifically stated,
“although most past experiences of the military in the conduct of propaganda campaigns
has been limited to periods of general war or limited war, the realities of the Cold War
213

US Army Counterinsurgency Force, FM31-22. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1963. 85.
Concepts for US Army Counterinsurgency Activities, Fort Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army Special Warfare School,
1962.
215
Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990. New York: Pantheon Books, 1992. 105-7.
214

86

indicate that military psychological operations has a major and essential mission to fulfill
in activities not involving full-scale hostilities.” The manual explicitly declared that the
primary target “for tactical psychological operations is the local civilian population.” If
all other methods failed, the manual advocated the targeting of civilians to instill terror:
Civilians in the operational area may be supporting their own government or
collaborating with an enemy occupation force. Themes and appeals disseminated
to this group will vary accordingly, but the psychological objectives will be the
same as those for the enemy military. An isolation program designed to instill
doubt and fear may be carried out … If these programs fail, it may become
necessary to take more aggressive action in the form of harsh treatment or even
abductions. The abduction and harsh treatment of key enemy civilians can weaken
the collaborators’ belief in the strength and power of their military forces. 216
Another military manual on handling sources also advocated the harsh treatment
of civilians. Handling Sources was used by U.S. Special Forces to teach recipient nations
how to cultivate government informants from within insurgent operations. The manual
encouraged techniques to gain formation such as the targeting of family members, threats
and use of physical violence. The CI operation should “cause the arrest of the
“employee’s parents, imprison the employee or give him a beating as part of the
placement plan of said employee in the guerrilla organization.” 217
The use of torture and intimidation was the cornerstone of U.S. CI operations.
Recipient militaries received expert training via U.S. Special Forces in the use of
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terrorism, and “abduction and harsh treatment” in order to make civilian dissent
extremely unsavory. This policy of terror was used so widely throughout Latin America
that it was generically termed “disappearances” by the victims’ families and human rights
group that began to monitor such activists. 218 The Colombian government would make
wide use of the U.S. CI methods and training to put down regime threatening guerilla
movements during the second half of the twentieth century.
The Colombian Peace Process

Though Colombia enjoyed a stable economy from the 1960s to the 1980s, the
majority of the Colombian populace did not see any economic growth. In 1986,
Colombia’s National Administrative Bureau of Statistics showed that 40 percent of
Colombians lived in poverty and 18 percent in absolute poverty (unable to meet basic
nutrional needs). 219 The level of poverty was further highlighted by the fact that the “top
three percent of Colombia’s landed elite own[ed] 71.3 percent of arable land, while fiftyseven percent of the poorest farmers subsist[ed] on 2.8 percent.” 220 The poverty was most
severe in rural areas, contributing to the mass urban migration that took place during this
time. In 1951, 61 percent of Colombians resided in rural areas, by 1983, that number had
fallen to only 26 percent. 221
This mass migration resulted in extensive shantytowns on the outskirts of
Colombia’s urban cities. The squalid conditions precipitated the rise of the urban lower218
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class, leading to increased protests, strikes, and support for the FARC. The continued
growth of the guerrilla movements, internationally visible signs of poverty in Colombia’s
urban centers, and the failure of the Colombian military to destroy the guerillas, forced
President Betancur to begin peace proceedings in 1982. The peace process was the first
of its kind in Colombia, and started with complete amnesty for guerilla fighters, which
was incentivized via financial credits, land, and housing to re-enter the civilian sector. 222
President Betancur the created the Peace Commission, which would advise him on the
peace process, and meet and negotiate with the representatives of the guerilla movements.
In response, a number of Colombia’s guerrilla groups agreed to a ceasefire in 1984.
The entire peace process sought to turn Colombia’s traditionally bipartisan
political system into more reform inclined parties. The FARC “was particularly interested
in the government’s promotion of reforms that would facilitate meaningful participation
in Colombia’s political life.” 223 The FARC established the Patriotic Union (UP) to
represent the left in Colombian politics and represent the peasant and working class
Colombians. The UP called for reform to end the supremacy of the Conservative and
Liberal parties in Colombian politics. The UP advocated for the popular election of local
officials, rural land reform, and the nationalization of foreign business, Colombian banks
and transportation.” 224
In spite of the seemingly successful peace proceedings, the Colombian military
and paramilitaries, supported and trained by the U.S., increased their CI offensive against
the guerrilla groups and civilians. Human Rights Watch noted that the majority of the
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Colombian military’s “security measures” were designed to control the “local residents”
in militarized areas. The Colombian military continued attacking guerrillas and even
assassinated former fighters who had received amnesty. 225 Americas Watch described the
situation during the first year of the peace talks, “Large parts of the country are
exclusively governed by the armed forces. To all intents and purposes, the armed forces
are the only government, their rule is harsh. It is marked by torture and massacres.” 226
Throughout the peace process, the U.S. continued to support the Colombian
military crackdown. The State Department’s annual human rights reports made no
mention of the extensive human rights abuses committed by Colombian military
personnel. The U.S. military continued to train the Colombian military and sent over $50
million worth of arms in the first year of the official “ceasefire.” 227 Continued U.S. CI
military aid and training thus legitimized the Colombian military actions and undermined
the peace proceedings.
The War on Drugs

When the Cold War came to a close, the U.S. substituted the “war on
communism” with the “war on drugs” as the justification for continued U.S. military aid
to South America. In a counter-drug strategy paper the State Department argued that the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in South America needed to “draw more
equipment and doctrine from the military as the task at hand ceases to be the traditional
law enforcement for which the agency was created.” Adding that the U.S. objective
225
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“should be a steady withdrawal of DEA” from the counter-drug role “as military and
economic assistance allows local [military] forces to take up these tasks.” 228 President
George Bush Sr. explained the logic of the expansion of anti-narcotic operations: the
“cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source” by destroying the
“crops wherever they are grown,” and the “labs wherever they exist.” 229
In September 1989, President Bush announced the Andean initiative, a five-year
plan that would send $2.2 billion in aid to Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. This initiative
would make these three states the leading recipients of U.S. military aid in the western
hemisphere. 230 One of the main conditions that Colombia would have to accept before
receiving aid was the restructuring of their economy to further allow the influx of U.S.
capital. In 1990, in return for accepting the conditions Colombia received $65 million in
military aid and 100 U.S. military advisors (Special Forces), to aid Colombian security
forces in the new counter-narcotics operations. 231
The Andean Initiative expanded the role of the Colombian military, the U.S.
Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency directly into counternarcotics mission. Unfortunately, the counter-narcotics initiatives often combined the
insurgency movements that had been brewing in Colombia for decades with the drugtraffickers. National Security Directive 18, which outlined the White House’s counternarcotics strategy, described the Andean Initiative as involving “expanded assistance to
indigenous police, military, and intelligence officials” which would be used to allow
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“them to regain control of their countries from an insidious combination of insurgents
and drug traffickers” with increased “military assistance to neutralize guerrilla support
for trafficking.” 232 From the very inception of the Andean Initiative, insurgents and drug
traffickers were intrinsically linked. This delineates an important shift in the justifications
for U.S. policy in Latin America; U.S. national security interests shifted from the
containment of insurgents linked to the spread of communism, to the containment of
insurgents linked to international drug traffickers. The longstanding military aid and
training itself was marginally repurposed, but the public rationale was completely
different, making it a fresh issue in the eyes of the American people.
Post 9/11 Policy

When President George W. Bush was elected in 2001, his administration wanted
to lower the military aid that had been flowing to Colombia for decades by 24 percent.
This decrease was accompanied by nearly exact increases in the countries that surrounded
Colombia. 233 This new aid package, the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), was justified
as part of the U.S.’s ongoing war on drugs. The U.S. State Department, in their
rationalization for the appropriations of the 2002 budget, stated that the goal of U.S. aid
in Colombia was to “help the Government of Colombia to eliminate all illicit cultivation
and the infrastructure which supports production of illicit drugs.” 234 The 2002 ARI
distributed $367 million in military aid and $147 million in social and economic aid to
Colombia. The military aid was used to maintain and repair military equipment that was
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provided to Columba and continue military training programs. Of the total aid package
that was sent to Colombia, 75 percent was going directly to Colombia’s military and
police. 235 Though supporters of the 2002 ARI pointed out that the initiative lowered the
number of U.S. military advisors in Colombia from 500 to 400, it placed no limits on
how those military advisors trained and employed local forces, nor the number of active
nationals.
During the aftermath of September 11, the U.S. foreign policy pivoted to exhibit a
strong counter-terrorist orientation. The primary shift towards a war on terror in
Colombia has maintained the substantial funding for the Colombian military, but has
altered its context to the language counter-terrorism from that of counter-narcotics.
Statements by US Senator John McCain, future Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, in 2002 revealed thought process behind this shift: “American policy
has dispensed with the illusion that the Colombian government is fighting two separate
wars, one against drug trafficking and another against domestic terrorists.” Senator
McCain explained that the U.S. has abandoned “any fictional distinctions between
counter-narcotic and counter-insurgency operations.” 236
After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the U.S. dropped the pretense that the military
assistance that it provided to Colombia as being driven solely for counter-narcotics, and
began to justify its funding as a strategy of counter-terrorism directed at the FARC, who
were reportedly linked to international terrorism in addition drug trafficking. U.S.
Attorney General John Ashcroft labeled the FARC as the “most dangerous international
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terrorist group based in the Western Hemisphere.” 237 The U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, ironically declared that the “40
million people of Colombia deserved freedom from terror and an opportunity to
participate fully in the new democratic community of American States.” 238 Even
Secretary of State Colin Powell drew comparisons between the FARC and Al-Qaeda to
justify aid, stating that there was little “difficulty in identifying [Bin Laden] as a terrorist,
and getting everybody to rally against him. Now, there are other organizations that
probably meet a similar standard. The FARC in Colombia comes to mind.” 239 Secretary
Powell’s Assistant Secretary, Rand Beers, declared in a sworn statement that it was the
positon of the State department that it “believed the FARC Terrorists have received
training in Al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan.” Assistant Secretary Beers was later
forced to admit that this statement was in fact a lie. 240 However, the point had already
been seared into the minds of the American people: the U.S. military aid that was sent to
Colombia supported pro-U.S. democracy and suppressed “terrorists.” Nowhere is it
mentioned how actual U.S. strategy and doctrine worked, the U.S. backed CI, which
could have itself been classified as state terrorism.
With the new counter-terrorist orientation the Bush Administration approved the
emergency Supplemental Appropriations request to review be reviewed by Congress. The
$28 billion global counter-terrorism bill contained numerous provisions that military aid
provided to Colombia should not only be used to wage a war on drugs, but to also fight
“terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
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the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC).” 241 This counter terrorist pivot continued in 2003 when the Bush administration’s
aid packaged appropriated nearly $538 million for Colombian military funding. Most
importantly though, is the fact that the 2003 ARI package softened the language used to
monitor how the Colombian military collaborated with paramilitary forces. Previous
policy had specified that the Colombian military must “vigorously prosecuting in the
civilian courts,” whereas the ARI called for “effective measures to sever links” between
the armed forces and paramilitaries. Further, the Colombian military was no longer
required to “cooperate fully,” now merely some ambiguous level of “cooperation” was
acceptable. 242 The ARI increased the levels of U.S. funding to the Colombian military,
while simultaneously decreased the protections that ensure Colombia complied with the
basic safeguards of human rights.
Ultimately, U.S. intervention in Colombia has attempted to stabilize the social,
economic, and political arrangements of the country, in order to align with the best
interest of the U.S. The Cold War provided a justification for the U.S. CI operations and
training to solidify the stability of the Colombian government through whatever means
necessary. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. continued its CI operations and
military aid under the guise of the war on drugs. Finally, after the September 11 attacks,
the U.S. has further incorporated the war on terror as one of its numerous justifications
for continued aid.
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Concluding Remarks
United States foreign policy, as with any nation’s foreign policy, has attempted to
create social, economic, and political conditions in the world that would most favor the
interests of the U.S. As the U.S. grew in power during the early 19th century, President
Monroe outlined a doctrine that prohibited European interference in the affairs of the
New World. Though, at the time, the U.S. retained neither the military nor the economic
power to enforce the doctrine, it revealed the future designs of U.S. foreign policy. The
U.S. viewed the Americas as off limits to Europeans, and wholly open to U.S. interests.
This doctrine served as the basis for the later notion of Manifest Destiny, and would
guide U.S. foreign policy in Latin America for well over a century.
Bolstered with the Monroe Doctrine and an increasingly well-funded navy, the
U.S. looked to strike away the influence of the British from Central America. The
discovery of gold in California had raised both the American civilian presence, and
transisthmian interest in the Central American nations. This interest was economic in its
foundation; Latin America was ripe for investment and European nations were viewed as
unfairly reaping the benefits of investment. U.S. clashes with Great Britain in Central
America where characterized by aggressive tactics, after the fact negotiations, and native
non-participation. Through these methods of diplomacy, the U.S. began blocking out the
Central American nations from European control, and secured their economic and
strategic interests for itself.
After the confrontations with the British the U.S. was faced with conflict from
within the Americas itself, Chile. After the War of the Pacific, Chile had positioned itself
as the most powerful nation in South America, a possible challenger to the U.S.’s rising
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power. The U.S. turned a minor diplomatic hiccup, the Baltimore Affair, into an
international crisis and threatened war against Chile. Chile, at the strong urging of the
European powers, gave into U.S. demands, thereby cementing the U.S.’s status as the
major power in the Americas.
The U.S. then looked to its southern border, and saw Cuba, a nation troubled with
internal and external uncertainties, as an economic opportunity ripe for the taking. The
U.S. invested heavily in the island, essentially incorporating it into the U.S. economy in a
way from which it could not be untangled without devastating effect. At a time of crisis
between Cuba and Spain, the U.S. landed military forces on the island, severing the last
major European connection in the Caribbean, and secured the island for its own economic
and political interests. At this point, the U.S. political and economic hegemony was
undisputed in the western hemisphere.
With the election of President Roosevelt in the 1930s, we see an important shift in
U.S. foreign policy. Recognizing the growing discontent and hostility in Latin America,
Roosevelt proclaimed that he would dedicate the nation to being a good neighbor, and
respect the rights of Latin American nations. Henceforth the U.S. would need a
sufficiently credible reason for intervention other than pure economic interest. Following
World War II the U.S. began supplying military aid and questionable training techniques
to stabilize the Latin American nations fighting against insurgencies. This aid was
justified as preventing the spread of communism, a very real fear throughout the western
world, though the U.S. undoubtedly reaped the economic benefit of stable, friendly
administrations. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. once again needed a
justification for continued aid to Latin America, and President Bush provided just that
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when he declared a war on drugs. Aid continued to flow the Latin American countries, as
nations that had fought communist insurgents now rebranded the insurgencies as drug
traffickers.
From the view of the average American, the post 9/11 world looks radically
different from the era of the cold war and its aftermath. Americans are constantly
reminded that the U.S. is in a “war against terror” by the NSA, the TSA, increased
security across the nation, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Latin American military and
training aid that was once appropriated to fight the communist insurgencies, then the
narco-insurgencies, is now used to fight insurgencies rebranded as terrorist organizations.
The tactics and procedures have not been radically changed, nor has the aid packages
themselves, which begs the questions what has really changed? While there have been
credible threats made from the Middle East, the answer in terms of Latin America is
nothing. For the cynical American interventionist, the 9/11 attacks were a dream come
true: the constant and unseen threat of terror that frightens most Americans to their very
core has written a blank check to the American government. Military aid justified under
the cloak of counter-terrorism is rarely challenged, and has provided the pretext for
American intervention in Latin America to secure U.S. economic and political interests
for the foreseeable future.
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